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Preface 
Finland practiced a policy of neutrality from the mid 
1950s to the beginning of the 1990s. This study explains why 
Finland chose neutrality after the Second World War and why it 
was ready, after the end of the Cold War, to give it up in favour 
of membership in the European Union. 
In addition to looking at the past five decades, this 
study traces the roots of Finnish foreign and security policy to 
the 19th century. The argument is that the model of foreign 
relations that was used during the Cold War was developed in 
the 19th century when Finland was an autonomous Grand Duchy 
of the Russian Empire. 
Despite historical arguments the main bulk of the study 
deals with a fundamental change in Finnish foreign and security 
policy that took place from 1990 to 1995. The transition period 
began with a unilater reinterpretation of Finland's postwar treaties 
(the Finnish-Soviet Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual 
Assistance Treaty of 1948 and the Peace Treaty of 1947) and 
ended with Finland's joining of the European Union in 1995. 
Finland's accession to the European Union begins a 
new phase in the history of Finland. It solifies Finland's position 
as a Scandinavian and as a European state. At the same time 
membership offers a new platform for cooperation with Russia 
and the Baltic states. In foreign and security policy membership 
in the EU combines old themes with new possibilities. Old themes 
included Finland's commitment to strengthening cooperative 
security in the context of the CSCE and the United Nations. New 
possibilities included the development of the Northern dimension 
of the Union's common foreign and security policy. 
Future is unwritten. If the cohesion of the European 
Union develops favourably, then elements of common security 
are likely to be strengthened in Finnish foreign and security 
policy. If Europe remains fractured and geopolitically divided, 
then the importance of national defence will be emphasised. The 
course Finland chooses to follow will be important for Europe at 
large. The reason is that Finland is the only member state of the 
European Union that has a long common border with Russia. 
Helsinki, 6. December 1994 
Risto E.J. Penttilä 
1 THE HISTORICAL ROOTS OF FINNISH 
FOREIGN POLICY 
During the Cold War, neutrality was taken for granted in 
Finland. It was seen as a natural, historically determined position 
for a small country next to a great power. Contrary to this belief, 
the roots of Finnish neutrality did not go very far back in time. In 
fact, Finland did not aim at achieving neutrality during the 
autonomy period, nor was it the primary aim of the Finnish 
government between the wars, a time when those responsible 
for foreign policy did their best to seek support from practically 
anywhere, including the states bordering on the Soviet Union, 
the Nordic Countries, the League of Nations, Germany, and 
bilateral arrangements with Sweden. 
A much more significant feature in the history of Finnish 
foreign policy has been the tug-of-war between two conflicting 
attitudes towards Russia, demands for compliance and loyalty 
on the one hand, issues most clearly formulated by J.V. Snellman 
(1806-1881), and elements of resistance and requests for outside 
help on the other. The most common pattern has been loyal 
separatism or restricted compliance. It should be remembered, 
however, that it would have been impossible to pursue a viable 
foreign policy or maintain the country's independence without 
occasional resistance. 
Although neutrality did not establish itself as a guideline 
for Finnish foreign policy until 1956, ideas of this kind can be 
said to have been broached for the first time more than a hundred 
years earlier. 
Dr. Risto E.J. Penttilä is an adviser on international security affairs to the 
Ministry of Defence. He has previously worked for the Finnish Institute of 
International Affairs and been visiting researcher at the Austrian and the 
Swedish Institute on International Affairs. His previous publications include 
Finland's Search for Security through Defence 1944-1989 (Macmillan 1989) and 
books in Finnish. Dr. Penttilä is educated at Oxford and at Yale University. 
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First considerations of neutrality 
Discussions on the question of neutrality were initiated in 
Finland in 1863, prompted by the change in the country's 
geopolitical position and the general emergence of the notion of 
neutrality in the Europe of the mid-19th century. This widespread 
talk of neutrality and the appreciation shown for the idea was 
surprising in view of the lack of respect for it during the 
Napoleonic wars, in the course of which there were numerous 
violations of the neutrality of states and the inviolability of sea 
traffic. Switzerland, for example, was forced to abandon its 
neutrality when first the French and then the Austrians conquered 
extensive parts of its territory.' 
The only neutral country which succeeded more or less in 
remaining aloof from the hostilities was the United States, which 
declared itself neutral in 1793. It is often forgotten that it was the 
example of the United States which led to the spread of the 
neutrality ideal in the 19th century. 
All in all, the 19th century can be regarded as marking the 
codification of the notion of neutrality, the passing of the relevant 
laws and the formulation of declarations. Switzerland was 
declared permanently neutral at the Congress of Vienna in 1815; 
Belgium in 1839 and Luxembourg in 1867, whereas Norway's 
desire for permanent neutrality was blocked by Sweden, with 
which it had an alliance at the time.3 More specific definitions of 
neutrality were also included in the maritime legislation.4  
The fact that the 19th century notion of neutrality had 
seemed to offer small countries a chance to escape the miseries of 
war was a matter of some significance for discussions of Finnish 
'foreign policy', in addition to which Sweden had assumed a 
policy of neutrality in the 1830's. 
Another factor that contributed to the neutrality polemic in 
Finland was the Crimean War, as it reminded the Finns that they 
were liable to become involved in conflicts between the Great 
Powers. The post-war period was also important with respect to 
the social and intellectual atmosphere in the country, as it was 
then that Finland opened itself up to Europe and to European 
liberalism and ideas on the freedom of trade. Discussions were 
held on the relations between Finland and Europe and between 
Finland and the Tsar of Russia, and on the principles f,overning 
Finland's relations with foreign countries.5 It can very well be 
claimed, in fact, that this opening up of the country to outside 
influences laid the foundation for the discussion surrounding 
the direction of Finnish foreign policy which has continued up to 
the present day. 
One of the most important issues was the very existence of 
the Finnish nation. At one extreme, Finland was considered an 
'internally sovereign' state which had laws of its own and 
occupied a position of its own among the nations of the world. 
This argument set out from the fact that the Tsar had issued a 
Sovereign Pledge in 1809 granting Finland the right to maintain 
its Swedish system of legislation, so that it could no longer be 
regarded as a province as it had been when part of the Kingdom 
of Sweden but rather as a state subject to the rule of the Tsar 
without actually being a part of Russia. The opposite, Russian 
viewpoint was that Finland was by no means a sovereign state 
but an autonomous area with privileges of its own which was 
nevertheless an integral part of the Russian Empire. 
New political groupings were set up in the country which 
differed not only on 'questions of foreign policy', but also on 
nationality issues: the Fennomans, who emphasised the 
importance of connections with the Finnish people and expressed 
their relief at the country's release from Swedish rule, and the 
Liberals, who valued connections with Sweden and were 
indifferent towards the Russians. 
This was the background against which neutrality was 
discussed in 1863, at the time of the Polish insurrection.6 The 
Liberals aimed most of all at increasing Finland's freedom of 
movement in relation to Russia and establishing a closer 
connection with Sweden, whereas the Fennomans, who espoused 
the ideas of J.V. Snellman, warned against taking advantage of 
the momentary weakness of Russia. 
The discussion was initiated by the newspaper Helsingfors 
Dagblad in April 1863, with the suggestion that Finland should 
declare herself neutral. The article can be regarded as a daring 
and imaginative one, the latter on account of the comparison it 
made with Belgium and Switzerland, which had gained their 
neutrality through international agreements, and its suggestion 
that Karl XV of Sweden could make the proposal that Finland 
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should be declared neutral.7 It was also stated in the article that 
neutrality should involve a certain degree of demilitarisation, an 
idea evidently prompted by the demilitarisation of the Aland 
Islands in 1856.1  Although quite impossible to implement in 
practice, as Russia had just started to deploy more soldiers and 
military equipment in Finland to preempt any surprise moves 
that might arise from the tense international situation, the 
proposal attracted considerable attention in Finland, with 
comments appearing in a number of other newspapers, such as 
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Abo Underrättelser, which discussed conditions under which the 
'neutralisation' of Finland would be a realistic target.9 
The most prominent opinion on neutrality was expressed 
by J.V. Snellman in his famous article 'War or peace in Finland'.10 
His message was clear: any aspiration towards neutrality would 
only lead to difficulties with the Tsar, which would ultimately 
destroy the entire country. Snellman maintained that for this 
reason Finland should prefer loyalty over neutrality." 
Snellman's analysis of the situation proved correct in view 
of the historical background. Finland could not declare itself 
neutral, as it was under the rule of the Tsar of Russia and 
consequently had reason to assume that disciplinary measures 
would follow if any attempt was made to gain neutrality. It is 
interesting to note, however, that Snellman did not approve of 
neutrality for other nations either, so that he had nothing good to 
say about Switzerland, for example. Even the idea of a country in 
which three linguistic groups formed one nation simply lay 
beyond his criteria for a sovereign state. Snellman pointed out 
that a state should be a manifestation of one language, one 
ideology and one national ethos.12 
Snellman's comment in Litteraturblad did not put an end to 
the neutrality discussions, however, and these continued in 
Helsingfors Dagblad, for example. The paper posed the rhetorical 
question 'Why could Finland not opt out of all wars and hostilities 
between foreign nations, as is the case with Switzerland and 
Belgium?"3 These arguments did not play any appreciable role 
once Snellman had emphasized the importance of loyalty to the 
Tsar, however, and the latter attitude was adopted as general 
policy in Finland. 
The discussion was revived more than a hundred years 
later when President Urho Kekkonen took it up in his speeches, 
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stating that Snellman's ideas would serve as a basis for a modern 
neutrality policy to be adopted by Finland. What is surprising 
here is that President Kekkonen was referring to statements in 
which Snellman had in fact denounced neutrality and come out 
in favour of loyalty. 
The loyalty suggested by Snellman was by no means to be 
practiced blindly, however. On the contrary, it was to be carefully 
considered and focused on the Tsar himself, not on Russia as 
such. The historian Jussi T. Lappalainen refers to Snellman as a 
'separatistic loyalist', an expression that would seem to hold 
good in that he was indeed a separatist when it came to relations 
with Russia, wishing to separate Finland from that country both 
politically and economically, while his loyalism was restricted to 
good relations with the Tsar, as he felt that it was only in this 
way that Finland could advance its special status. He further 
stated that this position should not be endangered by practicing 
a 'conjunctural policy' at a time when Russia was weak or its 
attention was drawn elsewhere. In other words, the country's 
position could be improved through careful manoeuvring, but 
there was no reason to talk of neutrality or independence. A 
more important aim was to ensure continued autonomy and the 
maintenance of Finnish culture, a Finnish civil service and a 
Finnish school system, all of which were essential for cultivating 
a national spirit. 
A change in compliance policy, 1890-1917 
Snellman's ideas of Finland's relations with Russia were re-
examined in the 1890's as a consequence of the Russification 
campaign launched by the Russian civil servants. An increasing 
number of Finns were now of the opinion that it was no longer 
sufficient to follow a compliance policy, and this led to a division 
between the supporters of constitutionalism and the supporters 
of compliance. The former favoured opposition, stating that one 
should not yield to Russian impositions but should resist them 
either actively or passively. One of the most prominent 
representatives of this wing was Leo Mechelin,14 whose book 
'Precis du droit public du Grand-duche de Finlande' (1886), later 
translated into German and Russian, made him known 
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internationally. The primary message of the book was that Finland 
was a state, not a province, as it possessed a separate legislation, 
constitution and economy. The publication aroused anger among 
civil servants in St. Petersburg and the Finnish advocates of 
compliance.15 
The compliance wing, led by Yrjö Sakari Yrjö-Koskinen, 
felt that it was simply impossible for Finland to resist the 
superiority of Russia. Even if Finland lost its autonomous position, 
it would not disappear as long as its national spirit, culture and 
language rested on a solid foundation. The compliance ideas 
generated by Yrjö-Koskinen nevertheless began to lose their 
conviction towards the turn of the century as Russia strengthened 
its grip on Finland. 
The increased Russian pressure provoked Agathon 
Meurman, E.G. Palmen and J.R. Danielson-Kalmari, leading 
figures in the Old Finns party, to distance themselves from the 
ideas of Yrjö-Koskinen, stating that compliance was impossible 
as long as the opposite side was aiming only at complete 
subordination. 
The new doctrine of restricted compliance was formulated 
most explicitly by J.R. Danielson-Kalmari in his pamphlet 'In 
which direction?', published in 1901.16 He stated that negotiations 
could be continued only as long as Russia recognised Finland's 
special position and that if all Russian action was governed by an 
'irrational desire to destroy', then compliance did not serve any 
'reasonable purpose.' Danielson-Kalmari maintained that if any 
resistance measures were taken, they should not set out from the 
principles of law as the constitutionalists would claim, as it had 
been proved throughout history that all formal rights are 
relentlessly wiped away if they do not conform to the prevailing 
conditions." 
Danielson-Kalmari did not abandon loyal separatism, 
however, but stated that good relations should be fostered with 
the Tsar as it was only through him that Finland could regain her 
special position. The task of bridge-building in this direction 
should be assigned to the civil servants, who should act in such a 
manner that no bonds would be broken. The Finnish people in 
turn should not give in, but even resort to passive resistance if 
need be. At the same time, it was important to maintain ideological 
ties with Europe, as 'development within a small country requires 
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access to the intellectual resources possessed by large ones'. This 
was also justified by the fact that nationalism and the notion of 
being a Finn could constitute a philosophy of life only through 
close interaction with the culture of Europe and the traditions of 
education which existed there.18 
Juho Kusti Paasikivi (1870-1956) can in many ways be 
regarded as an apprentice of Danielson-Kalmari. He spent a lot 
of his time at the state counsellor's summer villa at Vääksy, 
listening attentively to latter's opinions. As an emerging politician 
affiliated to the Old Finns, Paasikivi rejected Yrjö-Koskinen and 
accepted Danielson-Kalmari's principles of managing relations 
with Russia. In fact, when Paasikivi became Prime Minister after 
the Second World War, and eventually President in 1946, his 
actions were evidently based very much on the ideas put forward 
by Snellman and Danielson-Kalmari. 
Independence and orientation towards the West, 1917-1944 
The gaining of independence was followed by a great need 
for the country to stand on its own feet in the 1920's. The ideas of 
loyal separatism formulated by Snellman were now completely 
abandoned, since the Tsar was dead and there was no longer any 
need to express loyalty towards the new neighbour in the east - 
the Russians were mocked and the Bolsheviks despised. Relations 
with Sweden were not very good either, as people tended to 
scorn the maintaining of connections with the former mother 
country. The most complex issue of all, however, was relations 
with Germany, as many supporters of that former imperial power 
were shocked by its defeat in the World War and its transfer to 
the questionable democracy of the Weimar Republic. All in all, 
the order of the day in the 1920's was to be genuinely Finnish 
and capable of independent decisions. 
A posture of standing alone in the shadow of an 
unpredictable Russia was not what the Finnish government would 
have wanted in the long run, and there was extensive cooperation 
with Germany during the Finnish Civil War, as indicated by the 
decision to crown a German as King. This decision was never 
implemented, however, as Germany lost the war and Finland 
finally opted for a republican constitution in 1919. 
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After that Finland tried to establish contacts with the Baltic 
States and Poland, but this line was rejected in the early 1920's, 
as Marshal Mannerheim, for example, was strongly against it. 
The reason for this opposition was that the government was 
afraid that such cooperation would raise problems between 
Finland and Russia which could otherwise be avoided. 
Finland's next step was to seek the sympathy of the League 
of Nations, establishing connections which lasted up to the 1930's. 
It soon became evident, however, that this body was incapable of 
promoting Finland's security to any appreciable extent. This 
prompted a decision in the early 1930's to adopt a Scandinavian 
approach instead, which involved cooperation with Sweden, 
Norway and Denmark. This form of joint action was termed 
'cooperation in neutrality', but it also possessed military aspects. 
The aim was to form the Nordic Countries into a neutral zone 
under military supervision, a zone in which the participating 
countries were so closely united that an attack on one of them 
would automatically imply an act of aggression against them all. 
It is a well-known fact that this cooperation was a total failure, 
for Stalin attacked Finland and Hitler invaded Norway and 
Denmark, so that it was only Sweden which succeeded in staying 
out of the war. 
There is no need to look at the history of the Second World 
War itself in detail here, but there is one point which should be 
mentioned, that Finland resorted to German help during the 
Continuation War of 1941-44 and that it was this that enabled the 
country to defend itself successfully against the Russians. This 
cooperation terminated upon the signing of a temporary peace 
agreement in autumn 1944, resulting in the Lapland War, during 
which the Finnish troops forced the Germans in Lapland to 
retreat into Norway. 
The return to restricted compliance, 1944-1955 
The Finnish government was forced to change its national 
strategy completely after the Second World War. Support from 
the Nordic countries had not prevented involvement in the war, 
and cooperation with Germany had not provided success in it. 
Thus it was quite impossible to maintain an ideology of resistance 
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to the Soviet Union, and the only realistic possibility was to 
ensure the country's security and position in international terms 
in a spirit of mutual understanding with the Soviet Union, 
employing the philosophy originally formulated by Snellman. 
Having maintained its independence and avoided 
occupation, Finland was not, of course, in an exactly comparable 
position to that prevailing during the autonomy period, but the 
situation in 1944 did resemble that of the last decades of autonomy 
insofar as the Allied Control Commission, which exercised 
supreme power in the country, was in practice a Soviet body 
whose leader, Andrei Zhdanov, was above all Finnish law and 
thereby in a position resembling that of a Governor General. This 
new ruler had access to military power beyond the border and 
stationed in Porkkala within Finland. There were no attempts at 
Russification on this occasion, however, but instead Moscow 
aimed at promoting the position of the communists. All this was 
backed up by a renewed isolation of Finland from the west, just 
as in the times of autonomy. As the British Foreign Office 
reminded its members of the Control Commission, the Finns 
now had to 'survive on their own'.19 
A concrete return to the policy of compliance was marked 
by the selection of J.K. Paasikivi as Prime Minister and his later 
election as President, since, with the exception of a brief dallying 
with Germany, his basic inclinations and war-time actions had 
set out from the principle of compliance. He had demanded that 
negotiations should be continued even at the outbreak of the 
Winter War, when other politicians had already begun to favour 
resistance, and had endeavoured to establish relations with Stalin 
between the Winter War and the Continuation War.2° Paasikivi 
had identified himself with the opposition in favour of peace as 
the Continuation War had drawn on, and had been among the 
first to point to the necessity for a new foreign policy. 
After the restoration of peace, Paasikivi adopted Danielson-
Kalmari's principles regarding geopolitics and Finland's relations 
with her neighbour in the east. The Finns again had to accept 
that their country could not escape the power of the Soviet 
Union through resistance or excessive emphasis on sovereignty. 
On the contrary, time, patience, and most of all, restricted 
compliance were now required. In the same way the ideas of 
legitimate security advantages fostered by President Kekkonen 
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in particular can be traced back to Danielson-Kalmari, who had 
suggested in 1901 that Finland would never be in danger as long 
as it was capable of maintaining good relations with Russia. As 
he stated: "...a cold historical survey inevitably leads one to 
suggest that it was purely military interest, that is, a concern for 
the security of their own northern boundary and capital, which 
made the Russians regard the occupation of Finland as such an 
important issue.21 Paasikivi's message 45 years later was 
practically identical, with the only exception that occupation was 
replaced by the ceding of Karelia and the leasing of the Porkkala 
Peninsula. 
Paasikivi's conformity to a foreign policy model which 
was directly related to the one advocated in the earlier compliance 
period was so distinctive that Danielson-Kalmari, Yrjö-Koskinen 
and Snellman, who had known each other and passed the 
ideology on through personal friendship, can be regarded in a 
sense as having accompanied Paasikivi in his capacity as 
President. In particular, it can certainly be claimed that the 
doctrine of restricted compliance formulated by Danielson-
Kalmari was reintroduced into the country's official policy when 
Paasikivi became president. This was quite natural, as it was 
Danielson-Kalmari himself from whom Paasikivi had absorbed 
his ideas on foreign policy within the Finnish Party in Helsinki 
and through visits to the state counsellor's summer villa at Vääksy. 
Paasikivi's method proved a successful one, and Finland's 
freedom of movement in foreign policy matters increased step 
by step. The final peace agreement was signed in 1947, and the 
Control Commission left the country. This favourable trend did 
not continue, however, for it was at the beginning of 1948 that 
Stalin made his well-known proposal for a Treaty of Friendship, 
Cooperation and Mutual Assistance. 
Paasikivi considered the agreement as suggested by Stalin 
unnecessary and harmful for Finland, but had no choice but to 
enter negotiations, as it was essential to avoid any conflict with 
the Soviet Union. Finland's aim in the negotiations was to obtain 
an agreement which would provide the Soviet Union with a 
sufficient guarantee of the security of its north-western border 
without restricting Finland's freedom in terms of foreign policy. 
This aim was achieved as completely as one could have 
hoped for under the circumstances, and the resulting agreement 
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became known, in Kekkonen's words, as 'the Paasikivi dictate'. 
It differed from corresponding agreements established between 
the Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries in both 
the nature of the consultations required and the definition of the 
assistance to be offered, in both cases to Finland's advantage. It 
was, after all, more important for Stalin to establish a new network 
of agreements to cover his entire western border than to argue 
with Finland over precise formulations. Should the need ever 
arise to implement the agreement, the decisive question would 
in any case be the interpretation given to it by the more powerful 
party. 
Kekkonen's loyal separatism 1956-1981 
Paasikivi's successor, Urho Kekkonen, followed in his 
footsteps as far as foreign policy was concerned, emphasising 
the need for good relations in the east and restricted compliance, 
but his pattern of action differed in many ways from that of his 
predecessor. One of the major differences was that he exploited 
his country's good relations with the Soviet Union in order to 
gradually extend its freedom of movement first towards the 
Nordic Countries and later, through free trade agreements and 
the process initiated by the Conference on Cooperation and 
Security in Europe, towards more general interaction with Europe. 
Another major difference was that Kekkonen did not shun close, 
even exceptionally close, relations with the Soviet leaders. He 
was not afraid of this resulting in an increase in influence in both 
directions - from Helsinki to Moscow and vice versa - or else he 
must have reasoned that such close connections would be to 
Finland's advantage in any case. Finally, the third difference was 
that, while President Paasikivi in his time was inclined to play 
down the role of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and 
Mutual Assistance (FCMA Treaty), Kekkonen used it as the 
cornerstone of his foreign policy, emphasising its importance on 
every occasion and making it into a symbol of Finland's 'loyalty' 
towards the Soviet Union. 
Kekkonen's foreign policy was successful enough in the 
Khrushchev era, but things became more complicated when 
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Brezhnev took over and the Soviet Union ceased to recognise 
Finland's neutrality in the late 1960's and began to impose 
pressure instead. The situation required from Finland a similar 
attitude towards Moscow to that which had prevailed towards 
St. Petersburg during the autonomy period. 
The approach adopted by Kekkonen can evidently be 
regarded as a new version of the loyal separatism endorsed by 
Snellman. In fact, all the characteristics of Snellman's foreign 
policy ideas were present in Kekkonen's thinking. Snellman had 
been a loyalist with respect to relations with the Tsar but a 
separatist with regard to the Russian state. Kekkonen, in turn, 
was loyal to the Kremlin but a separatist vis-à-vis the Soviet 
Union. In addition, where Snellman aimed at making a distinction 
between the positions of Poland and Finland, Kekkonen 
emphasised the contrast between Finland and all the Eastern 
European countries. Snellman and Kekkonen both argued for 
establishing personal relations with the leadership of their eastern 
neighbour, maintaining the confidence of that leadership and 
pursuing a unanimous foreign policy. They also shared a belief 
in the rise of the eastern nations, to the extent that Snellman had 
predicted as early as the 1840's that the Slavic peoples would 
eventually resume a dominant position in Europe. Kekkonen 
was likewise convinced up to the 1970's that the Soviet Union 
posed an extremely powerful economic and political challenge 
to the west. 
In addition to personal ideologies, the above similarities 
also extended to elements of Finland's relations with the east, the 
most important aspect being perhaps that both were apt to cling 
to one agreement of particular significance to the nation. In the 
period of autonomy that agreement was the Sovereign Pledge 
issued in 1809, while in Kekkonen's era it was the FCMA Treaty. 
The agreements themselves differed greatly, however, as 
the former was interpreted as favourable to Finland, promising 
that the country's position would not change, while the latter 
was regarded as an overtly oppressive factor liable to reduce 
freedom of movement in foreign policy. They shared just one 
feature in common: that they both served to regularise official 
relations between Finland and her eastern neighbour, and it was 
for this reason that they both came to occupy a prominent position 
in the country's foreign relations. The question was not what 
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was written in the documents but how they should be interpreted. 
The Finnish people did not immediately recognise the 
opportunities associated with either of the agreements. In fact, 
Finland woke up to the realisation that it was a nation in the 
1860's only after noticing that it possessed its own laws as 
confirmed by the Tsar of Russia in his Sovereign Pledge, just as it 
was not until the return of Porkkala that Finland could see its 
way to declaring its neutrality, even though according to President 
Kekkonen this 'concept of neutrality' was incorporated in the 
preamble to the FCMA Treaty. 
The mere statutory opportunity to gain a new position was 
not enough, however, for there was disagreement between 
Finland and St. Petersburg at the end of the autonomy period 
over whether the Sovereign Pledge was sufficient to render 
Finland an 'internally sovereign state', the Russians claiming 
that Finland enjoyed no special status whatsoever. Similarly a 
debate arose a hundred years later, in the late 1960's, when the 
Soviet Union abandoned its unreserved recognition of Finland's 
neutrality and launched new discussions in which this was viewed 
as being in opposition to the Agreement. Finland saw no 
inconsistency between the two, but the Soviet Union did. In its 
opinion, the primary issue was the Agreement, while neutrality 
was no more than an "aspiration" on the part of the Finns. 
These two periods were also both characterised by the 
appending of pseudonyms to published articles. The pseudonyms 
such as Komissarov, Liimatainen and Pohljobkin employed in 
the Kekkonen era resembled very much those of Kuoharinen, 
Kekäläinen and Katkov used in the autonomy period. In addition, 
it was customary in both eras to quote Finland as an example of a 
situation of two neighbouring countries living in peace and 
harmony, as the "showcase policy" of Alexander Iland Brezhnev's 
idea of Finland as an example of peaceful coexistence were in the 
end quite closely related. 
Urho Kekkonen has often been blamed for showing 
excessive compliance towards the Soviet Union, and there was 
even talk of this mode of behaviour spreading to other countries, 
a phenomenon known as'Finlandisation'. In addition, the effects 
of such a brotherly attitude have been regarded as more harmful 
to Finland than was ever admitted during the Kekkonen era.22 
Although these claims can be said to hold good to some extent, 
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one should not forget that Kekkonen set out to resist Soviet aims 
whenever these seemed to endanger Finland's international 
position. In fact he threatened to resign if the word 'neutrality' 
were not included in official statements in 1971, although he 
admittedly had to back down over this later. In addition, 
Kekkonen supervised the concluding of a free trade agreement 
with the EEC despite Brezhnev's opposition, dismissed the Soviet 
ambassador when he tried to interfere directly in Finland's 
internal affairs and rejected the Soviet Union's proposal for joint 
military manoeuvres in 1978. Finally, it should also be 
remembered that Kekkonen balanced his compliance with the 
east by establishing significant contacts with many western 
countries. 
Koivisto as President, 1982-1994 
Mauno Koivisto was elected president in 1982 under 
conditions which can be considered exceptional by Finnish 
standards: it was the first time since the Second World War that 
the Soviet Union made no attempt to influence the elections. It 
was generally known, however, that Koivisto as a candidate was 
not looked on very favourably by the Soviet leadership. 
Mauno Koivisto's foreign policy at the beginning of his 
presidency was characterised by two features: a desire to preserve 
the political traditions of his predecessor and a gradual 
disengagement from person-centred foreign policy. Koivisto's 
talk of not allowing anyone to taint the heritage of Kekkonen and 
Paasikivi and his prompt action in renewing the FCMA Treaty in 
1983, years before its expiry, were understandable in the light of 
the fact that at the time when he became President the Soviet 
Union was still led by Brezhnev, the very same person who had 
attempted to deprive Finland of her neutrality in the 1970's. 
An entirely new approach was adopted to the problematic 
question of the relation between the FCMA Treaty and Finnish 
neutrality under Koivisto. In contrast to the reaction in the 1970's, 
when Finland still clung to the neutrality concept, the problem 
was denied altogether during the Koivisto era by stating that 
there was no inconsistency between the two. Ideas of the above 
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kind had been put forward earlier, but what was new was that 
there were no attempts in Finnish foreign policy to evoke any 
recognition of neutrality from the Soviet Union. The fact that the 
official statements issued between Finland and the Soviet Union 
still talked about neutrality as a goal to be aimed at, about the 
Paasikivi-Kekkonen policy and an active, peace-oriented 
neutrality policy did not worry Finland any longer, as neutrality 
was now on a sufficiently firm footing and was capable of 
withstanding even the most devious definitions proposed by the 
Soviet Union. 
The main tenet of the doctrine created in the early 1980's 
was that neutrality and the FCMA Treaty were treated as strictly 
separate issues. The latter was regarded as a matter which only 
concerned relations between Finland and the Soviet Union, and 
any comments on it were to be restricted to documents drawn up 
by these two countries, while neutrality was a matter of the 
relations between Finland and other countries and was 
consequently not to be included in documents of the above kind. 
It should be noted, however, that in multilateral instances such 
as the Conference on Cooperation and Security in Europe the 
Soviet Union expressed its approval of Finland's neutrality. The 
new pattern of action gained extensive approval in Finland, 
where only the newspaper Tiedonantaja and a group of left-wing 
activists continued to insist that Finland's foreign policy should 
set out entirely from the FCMA Treaty. 
The rise of Gorbachev to power was not enough in itself to 
solve this problem, nor those surrounding the credibility of 
Finland's neutrality policy in the eyes of the west. One indication 
of this is the doctoral dissertation published on this topic in 1988 
by Paavo Väyrynen, several times foreign minister of Finland.23  
The issue was finally settled in October 1989, when President 
Gorbachev officially recognised Finland's neutrality and the 
continued importance of the FCMA Treaty. In a sense, he was 
resuming the practice initiated by Khrushchev in that he linked 
the two questions together, thereby "defusing" Finland's foreign 
policy doctrine of the 1980's, which was based on maintaining a 
distinction between them. This gave the Finnish government a 
chance to consider the formulation of a new doctrine. 
President Gorbachev's visit to Finland epitomized the 
critical times that Europe was going through. The visit brought a 
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welcome message regarding Finland's neutrality, but it also raised 
serious topics for discussion by those responsible for her foreign 
policy. The problem was that, as far as both its mode of operation 
and its traditions were concerned, Finland's foreign policy was 
essentially based on the status quo, i.e. the country had grown 
accustomed to living and operating successfully in a world 
divided into two zones. The collapse of this world necessitated a 
complete re-evaluation of relations with the Soviet Union and 
with other nations. 
The results of this re-evaluation were made available to the 
public for the first time on 5th September 1990,24  when President 
Mauno Koivisto, who habitually replaced formal policy 
declarations with informal interviews, presented the basic outlines 
of a new doctrine in a TV interview. He stated that the 
international environment in which Finland was operating had 
changed: the former divided world no longer existed and the 
Great Powers were on the same side. As far as Finland's principles 
of action were concerned, Koivisto observed that there was now 
more freedom to identify with global issues. The first concrete 
example of the mutual understanding which prevailed between 
the Great Powers in the international arena was seen following 
the Iraqi attack on Kuwait, and it was by virtue of this mutual 
understanding that Finland was able to offer its representative to 
the UN Security Council when a committee was being set up to 
supervise the implementation of sanctions on Iraq. 
Measures were also initiated to apply the new doctrine to 
the basic structures of Finland's foreign policy. Where the 
country's freedom of action had earlier been expanded by means 
of new initiatives, the Finnish government now decided to turn 
its attention to the basic institutional elements of its policy: the 
Peace Treaty of Paris and the FCMA Treaty. It declared 
unilaterally in September 1990 that the military restrictions 
contained in the peace treaty could no longer be regarded as 
valid and that the references to Germany in the agreement were 
obsolete. The timing of this move was selected carefully, for the 
declaration was made after Moscow had agreed on the unification 
of Germany but before the actual unification date. If Finland had 
waited any longer, it would have been the only European state 
whose sovereignity was still restricted by a post-war peace treaty. 
It was important from the point of view of the relations between 
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Finland and the Soviet Union that Finland should act alone, 
without consulting Moscow first, as if to emphasize that it was 
no longer necessary to do so. 
The earlier principle of compliance was not abandoned 
entirely, however, as Finland adopted an extremely cautious 
attitude towards the independence process in the Baltic States, as 
indeed in other matters related to the disintegration of the former 
Soviet Union. Efforts were made up to the very end to renew the 
Friendship Treaty, as it was believed that it was only through 
contractual loyal separatism that Finland could ensure her scope 
for action in the future. It was also believed that the new doctrine 
should be constructed with a view to a world in which it would 
be the Soviet Union and the United States rather than Europe 
that would control developments taking place in Finland's 
operative environment. 
The Finnish government could perhaps be criticised for the 
slowness of its reactions, but it should be borne in mind that the 
basic concept in its foreign policy, the neutrality of the Cold War 
era, had by no means proved an unsuccessful one. For the first 
time in its history as an independent country, Finland was now 
in a situation of having to change its foreign policy despite the 
fact that its national strategy had proved correct, a decision 
which was understandably difficult to make. 
One slight touch of historical irony in all this is that the 
neutrality emphasized during the Cold War era resembled 
autonomy in that once it had been achieved to the full it was not 
sufficient for the Finns any longer. It was time to look for a new 
national strategy and a new pattern for the country's foreign 
policy. 
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2 TOWARDS THE EUROPEAN UNION 
The radical changes in Europe and the Soviet Union in 1989-
91 compelled Finland to alter its national strategy and foreign 
policy. Restricted compliance was no longer valid as a strategy, 
as Russia was no longer interested in Finland but was 
concentrating its efforts on establishing direct relations with 
Europe and the United States. Loyal separatism was similarly 
out of the question, as the disintegration of the Soviet Union 
(which took place formally in December 1991, but was a fact 
some time earlier) also demolished the political structures to 
which Finland had been loyal. Moscow no longer tried to hamper 
Finland's integration with the western countries, but Finland 
alone now had to decide whether or not to follow the example of 
the other EFTA countries and apply to join the European 
Community. 
This decision was not so much a question of security policy 
as a change of orientation in which all the factors contributing to 
the welfare and success of the Finnish people required re-
evaluation. Questions of the ability of a small nation to influence 
the affairs of a vast community and questions of democracy, 
regional policy, agriculture, environmental effects and 
development within the EC were all of major significance when 
making the final decision. It is nevertheless obvious that no such 
decision would have been made at all had the analysis been that 
membership of the EC would be harmful to Finnish security. 
Identification of the factors which enabled Finland to consider 
joining the EC and suggested that membership was indeed the 
best alternative requires a further examination of Finland's 
integration policy from 1989 onwards. 
Finland and the new Europe 
The changes in Central Europe and the Soviet Union were 
on balance favourable ones for Finland. The sudden drop in 
trade with the Soviet Union (from nearly 25% of total foreign 
trade in the 1980s to 3-4%) was more than compensated for by 
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the transformation in the political situation, the most 
advantageous political development being that Finland's freedom 
of movement in foreign policy increased significantly. The 
problem was that Finland was a status quo nation which had 
found its place in a divided Europe but suddenly realised that it 
did not know how to react to the radical changes taking place in 
the world. Even though measures were being taken to modernise 
the country's foreign policy (see end of previous chapter), it was 
still characterised by an emphasis on continuity. Finland was 
obviously prepared for detente proving to be no more than a 
passing phase and considered a return to the earlier confrontation 
between the Soviet Union and the United States to be merely a 
matter of time. 
This reliance on continuity was hampered by the fact that, 
in addition to Eastern Europe, enormous changes were also taking 
place in the west. The advocates of integration declared that the 
old nation-centred international system established in Western 
Europe in 1648 was being replaced by an entirely new kind of 
system which involved interaction at three levels: cooperation 
between regions and between nations, together with a stratum of 
supranational decision-making. Declarations of the above kind 
were looked on sceptically in Finland, the general opinion being 
that integration was something which would take place in Central 
Europe but in the end would not concern the north. The only 
thing which was considered really important was to ensure that 
Finland's own products would have access to the internal markets 
which were being widely publicised and planned in Europe. 
The attitude of Finland towards Western European 
integration proceeded through distinct stages. The first major 
boost to the integration policy was the proposal made in 1989 by 
Jacques Delors, Chairman of the EC Commission, for the 
establishment of a European Economic Space. The aim was to 
grant extensive economic advantages to the EFTA countries so 
that these would not apply for membership but would remain 
outside the EC proper, which would become, as it were, the 
nucleus of Europe. The proposal was just what Finland needed: 
it implied participation without taking part, guaranteeing free 
entry to the internal markets of the EC for Finnish products, 
people, services and capital without involving any of the political 
challenges posed by actual integration. 
Unfortunately, Delors' proposal failed to prevent the EFTA 
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countries from submitting membership applications. The first 
country to break ranks was Austria, which made its application 
to Brussels in summer 1989. This decision was prompted by 
economic pragmatism, as the country's economy was extremely 
dependent on internal markets, but also by a great deal of political 
idealism, since it believed that as a member of the EC it could act 
as a major link between east and west. It is also possible that 
Austria's application was promoted by a desire to gain a 
competitive advantage by taking action before the other EFTA 
countries.'5  
This move did not arouse any particular concern in Finland. 
Austria occupied a strategically less exposed geographical 
position, and one which was further eased by the gradual 
disintegration of the Warsaw Pact. Finland's situation was quite 
different, as it shared a border with the Soviet Union, which did 
not look favourably on Austria's EC application. An indication 
of Finland's indifference to Austria's decision was that no serious 
proposals were made for any discussion on issues related to 
possible Finnish membership of the EC until the Swedish 
Parliament decided on 12th December 1990 to authorize its 
government to make such an application, which it did in June 
1991. 
Sweden's decision to apply for membership of the EC was 
accompanied by a suggestion by its Foreign Minister, Sten 
Andersson, that Finland and Norway should make similar 
applications at the same time. This proposal had apparently not 
been negotiated at all at the diplomatic level and was rejected 
out of hand in Finland. President Mauno Koivisto was clearly 
annoyed at it and did not even try to hide his disapproval, 
pointing out in interviews that this was by no means the first 
time that Finland had been humiliated by Sweden. The reasons 
for such an emotional reaction on part of the President must be 
sought in the age-old feelings of Finnish inferiority relative to the 
Swedes, and even in the bitter experiences with the NORDEK 
project in the late 1960's, an ambitious attempt to launch an 
integrated Nordic economic area. Koivisto had been Prime 
Minister at that time, and had had the thankless task of opting 
out of the project, a decision which had aroused anger among the 
Swedes. It is evident, however, that the President's reaction was 
above all based on a profound analysis of the effect of the Swedish 
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action on Finland's international position. 
It had been a basic principle in integration policy after the 
Second World War that Finland could not afford to remain outside 
any economic region which already involved both Sweden and 
all Finland's major customers, i.e. Germany, Great Britain and 
the other Central European countries. The justification given for 
this was that the Swedish paper and metalworking industries 
would otherwise conquer the markets formerly commanded by 
Finland. It was this principle that had drawn Finland into the 
EFTA arrangements and the EEC free trade agreement in the 
wake of Sweden. 
As far as foreign policy issues were concerned, Finland's 
post-war success story had rested on two mutually supportive 
pillars: skilful management of relations in the east and the fact 
that Finland did not stand alone in geopolitical terms. An 
indication of this is the fact that during the Cold War era Sweden 
and Finland formed a neutral buffer zone which was sufficiently 
convincing both militarily and politically to guarantee 
predictability and stability in the Nordic area. The decision of 
Sweden to abandon this for the EC thus marked an end to the 
joint security zone. Sweden could be expected to align itself with 
the other EC countries in the case of a new confrontation between 
east and west, whereas Finland would be left as an isolated 
buffer between two major powers. A trend of this kind would 
have been difficult for Finland to accept, as the country would 
have had to compensate for Sweden's disengagement from the 
neutral zone by improving its own defences, particularly its air 
defences. On the other hand, Swedish membership of the EC 
without Finland would have marked an end to the Nordic 
orientation, as Sweden would most likely have focused its 
attentions on European affairs. The Nordic Council might have 
been kept alive as a kind of historical relic, but Nordic cooperation 
would have lacked any content at the practical level. This would 
have compelled Finland to look for new groups with which to 
identify in the international arena. There would not have been 
very many alternatives available, in fact, for the position of 
Switzerland as a neutral country outside the EC would not have 
profited Finland in any way, due to the extreme geopolitical and 
geoeconoric differences between the two, while the anchoring 
of Finland's security policy to that of Norway, a NATO country, 
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would also have been out of the question. All that was left was 
either closer economic and political cooperation with the Soviet 
Union or reliance on the independence of the Baltic States and 
the establishment of a new pact between the nations bordering 
on Russia. It is evident that Finland found neither of these 
alternatives very attractive, for historical reasons. 
Sweden's decision to apply for EC membership can thus be 
regarded as having demolished Finland's post-war economic 
integration policy and undermined the foreign policy which had 
been practiced consistently over the years. It was thus no wonder 
that the Finnish foreign policy leadership was annoyed. There 
were a number reasons why they simply could not yet follow 
Sten Andersson's advice to board the EC train. First and foremost, 
it was still impossible to say what direction trends in the Soviet 
Union would take, so that the possibility of a return to traditional 
communism maintained by military means could not be excluded. 
Another reason was that no serious thought had been given to 
Finnish membership of the EC, and this lack of discussion in 
itself hampered evaluation of the consequences for the country 
and its neutrality. Thirdly, Finnish industry still held out hopes 
for a reintroduction of the special trading arrangements which 
had applied with the Soviet Union. EC membership would not 
have allowed any return to these familiar, safe market shares 
established on political grounds, as the EC countries had a joint 
policy regarding external trade. Participation in the European 
Economic Space still offered a chance of resuming these special 
arrangements. 
Finnish integration policy took its next step when the centre-
right coalition government led by Esko Aho came into power. It 
was stated in the government's programme26 that Finland still 
hoped to sign the EES agreement, although without precluding 
any other alternatives. This bold opening gambit from a 
government led by the Centre Party may be attributed to the fact 
that either the opponents of EC membership had not yet organised 
themselves or that such opinions simply did not yet exist (Gallup 
polls indicated that more than 60% of the population were in 
favour of EC membership and that many people thought that 
Finland already was a member). Thus discussions began over 
the remote possibility that Finland might one day consider 
applying for EC membership. On the one hand there was a fear 
of Finland finding itself in the role of an eastern outpost of the 
West, while on the other hand it was pointed out that living 
alone beside an unpredictable eastern neighbour had never been 
a bed of roses either. 
The unsuccessful coup of August 1991 in the Soviet Union 
provided the final major impulse for Finland's integration policy. 
The first reports of the coup seemed to verify the Finnish fear 
that rapprochement was only a temporary phenomenon and to 
suggest that the Soviet Union would inevitably slide back into its 
former ways. Discussions were initiated in Finland on a return to 
the earlier compliance policy, and satisfaction was expressed 
that the political leadership was already personally acquainted 
with Yanayev. 
It was not long before influential people emerged in the 
economic sector who were eager to draw up plans for a new 
flourishing of trade between Finland and the Soviet Union, for 
prospects were now opening up for Finland to benefit from the 
expertise in politically regulated business relations that had been 
gained during the Cold War era. This opportunity came to 
nothing, however, as the communists failed to resume power. If 
the coup had succeeded, Finland would have been still more 
closely aligned with the western countries than during the Cold 
War, since the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact meant that the 
East had moved further eastwards and Finland was losing its 
position as an outpost. 
Finland was quick to react to the successful counter-
revolution mounted by Boris Yeltsin. Where ministers had earlier 
been advised not to comment on Finland's EC membership, 
Prime Minister Esko Aho, in a speech in September 1991, dropped 
the bombshell which had been expected for a long time: he 
revealed that a committee had been set up to examine the pros 
and cons of EC membership.27 Aho stated that particular attention 
should be paid to the implications of membership for Finland's 
economy and security. 
One of the most difficult tasks for the government regarding 
Finland's EC membership application was to formulate an idea 
of the defence policy dimensions involved. Quite disparate 
opinions were expressed on this point within the EC at the end of 
1991, a trend which also continued later. On the one hand there 
was the Continental school of thought that put its faith in 
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development of the Western European Union and the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy, and on the other there was the 
Atlanticist school, which emphasised the importance of NATO 
and the traditional links between the United States and Europe. 
In addition to their reliance on different defence organisations, 
their argumentation set out from different premises and employed 
different logical structures. The Continentals accepted the neo-
functionalist logic of ever-deepening integration which will 
naturally extend into the field of military security, while the 
Atlanticists tended to take a more pragmatic, and at the same 
time more neo-rationalist approach to questions of security. This 
was an entirely new situation for Finnish decision-makers. Finland 
had mastered the realist approach during the Cold War by making 
a virtue out of the necessity of having to deal with the Communist 
leaders in the Kremlin. Now her politicians and civil servants 
were being asked to forget the old realist paradigms and to enter 
the world of the neo-functionalists and neo-realists. This certainly 
required some degree of acclimatisation. 
Reaching a decision 
Once the Maastricht summit had been concluded, all the 
major elements were at hand for Finland's EC decision: the far-
reaching changes which had taken place in Europe had also 
altered its geopolitical map, and the attempted coup in Moscow 
in August had made it impossible for the Soviet Union to return 
to the obsolete system maintained by the combined forces of the 
KGB, the Communist Party and the army. The Maastricht summit 
had created a new framework for the future development of the 
European Community. There was nevertheless one further 
historical change which took place before Finland made its final 
decision and which facilitated assessment of the situation: this 
was the transfer of power in Moscow to Boris Yeltsin in December 
1991. With both Gorbachev and the Soviet Union forced into 
retirement, it was clear to each and every person in Finland that 
they were really witnessing a historical turn of events. It was 
now necessary to take prompt action to ensure that Finland 
would come to occupy a maximally favourable position in the 
restructured international system which was emerging in Europe. 
The EC report submitted to Parliament by the Finnish 
government in January 1992 marked a major step towards 
Brussels and a new national strategy. Where it had been 
emphasised in earlier integration reports that EC membership 
could not be combined with Finland's policy of neutrality, the 
government now felt that such a combination was in fact possible, 
thanks to the change in the neutrality concept brought about by 
the altered situation in Europe. This suggested that the very 
essence of neutrality, non-participation in military alliances, could 
be combined with EC membership. The general security policy 
conclusion reached in the report was that the EC would not 
cause any insurmountable security problems for Finland, so that 
the country could be a member without being regarded as a 
military outpost of the West on the borders of Russia. On the 
other hand, it was also stated that any need for the EC to resort to 
coercion measures might involve Finland in a difficult situation. 
The presentation of the EC report was followed by a short 
but intense discussion on the security implications of membership, 
a discussion in which the Ministry of Defence and the 
Commander-in-Chief played a central role. The reason for the 
high profile maintained by the defence establishment was that 
neither the President, the Foreign Minister nor the Prime Minister 
was ready to reveal his own position regarding the EC issue 
following the publication of the government's report, nor was 
any of them willing to discuss the manner in which membership 
would affect Finland's security status. There were no such 
hindrances in defence circles, however, as the Minister of Defence, 
Elisabeth Rehn, had expressed her support for EC membership 
much earlier and now stated openly that the common interest 
required that she should contribute to these discussions which 
were so crucial from the point of view of Finland's international 
position. The Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces, Admiral 
Jan Klenberg, and the Chief of General Headquarters responded 
to the wishes expressed by the President and Prime Minister for 
general public discussion on this topic by putting forward their 
own opinions, and the officials of the Ministry of Defence also 
took part. In actual fact, the active role played by the Ministry of 
Defence would probably have escaped unnoticed if the President, 
Prime Minister and Foreign Minister had themselves been 
prepared to speak out on the possible foreign and security policy 
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consequences. It was the silence prevailing elsewhere that drew 
most of the attention to the opinion of the military. 
Speaking at the opening of a national defence course in 
January 1992, Rehn and Klenberg discussed the EC question 
from the point of view of security policy. The message was that 
Finland's defence would remain in the hands of the Finns 
themselves, according to the principle established by August 
Ehrensvärd in his time, so that no foreign troops or bases would 
be allowed and Finland would continue to maintain a credible 
defensive capacity relative to its international environment. In 
addition, both of them made it clear that applying for EC 
membership would not entail seeking any kind of military 
security, even though Klenberg did state that 'the community as 
such could greatly enhance the security of its member countries.' 
Elisabeth Rehn discussed in her speech the possibilities of 
the EC contributing to the security of its member countries in 
terms other than military ones, taking it for granted that Finland 
would do better by joining the EC than by operating outside it 
"isolated from our traditional interest groups, that is the neutral 
countries and the Nordic Countries". She also stated that EC 
membership would enhance Finland's security in two ways: 
firstly, "being a part of a larger political community would reduce 
the probability of the country being subjected to pressures that 
would detract from its security", and secondly, "it would enable 
the country to exercise a direct influence on decisions made in 
the EC's ministerial meetings regarding the security of the whole 
of Europe". 
The Finnish Prime Minister, Esko Aho, and the Foreign 
Minister, Paavo Väyrynen, reported some weeks later that they 
were in favour of EC membership. In his own comments, 
Väyrynen ended up with the same evaluation of Finland's security 
policy as Rehn and Klenberg, emphasising the importance of not 
entering into any military alliance and of maintaining an 
independent defence. In his capacity as Foreign Minister, 
Väyrynen nevertheless stressed the significance of the Conference 
on Security and Cooperation in Europe as a process which united 
the entire continent and which could in the long term be fashioned 
into a 'collective security system'. This emphasis on the role of 
the CSCE was important in order to avoid giving a picture of 
Finland as aligning itself only with Western Europe, as the aim 
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was also to maintain good relations with the east and to foster 
the vision of a security framework covering the whole of Europe. 
The President, Mauno Koivisto, expressed his opinions on 
the EC in a speech given at the opening of Parliament in January 
1992. He emphasised the significance of Finland's EC decision 
and the fact that "no report or discussion can provide any 
unanimous, entirely acceptable idea of what the right decision 
should be". Personally, he was in favour of EC membership on 
economic grounds, as he regarded Finland as having become 
highly dependent on other countries as far as energy supplies 
and the functioning of the agricultural sector were concerned. 
"As long as we are dependent on foreign trade we will also be 
dependent on decisions made elsewhere. This being the case, I 
feel that it is better to have a vote where such decisions take 
place." 
The fact that Koivisto did not comment on the effects of EC 
membership on Finland's foreign and security policy attracted 
considerable attention in public. His omission of these issues in 
fact left a clear message: by specifically not discussing them, 
Koivisto was suggesting that Finland's decision did not set out 
from security speculations. In other words, as the EC's aims 
were not military but purely political and economic ones, there 
was simply no need for Finland to emphasise military issues or 
questions of security policy. This approach was in line with the 
general contention within the EC that the gulf between east and 
west should be bridged through political and economic 
cooperation. 
The final touch was put to Finland's preparations for the 
EC membership application process by a declaration made to 
parliament by the government in March 1992 which noted that 
"Finland's national interests seem to be best secured through 
entering the European Community". No conditions were placed 
upon membership, but rather attention was paid to the aims and 
ideas fostered by the government in this respect. 
It was also mentioned in the statement that "Finland 
supports the strengthening of human rights, democracy and 
constitutional government and the construction of a united 
Europe, as laid down in the principles of the Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe." This confirmed that EC 
membership would not change Finland's foreign policy aims, as 
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the EC's own objectives in any case set out from the principles 
formulated by the CSCE. 
Disagreement had arisen within the government on the 
use of the word 'neutrality' when preparing their official 
declaration. The word was included at the request of the ministers 
belonging to the Centre Party, however, it being stated that 'in 
the new Europe in which no cold-war division into two camps 
exists any longer, the essence of Finland's neutrality can be 
characterised as abstention from joining any military alliance 
and the maintaining of an independent defence.' This formulation 
was almost identical to that submitted to the Swedish parliament 
by its government in summer 1991, the expression 'the hard core 
of neutrality' being borrowed from the Swedes. The difference 
between Finland and Sweden in this respect was that Sweden 
had given up the term for two reasons when Carl Bildt became 
Prime Minister. Firstly, it was thought in Sweden that it would 
give rise to unnecessary misunderstandings within the EC, as it 
could be taken to imply a desire to avoid any close cooperation 
or interaction with the EC countries. Secondly, Swedish foreign 
policy had undergone such a profound change at the end of the 
Cold War era that the term was no longer considered justified. 
Instead of neutrality, Sweden began to emphasise the country's 
European identity and independent defence system. 
The Finnish government published its EC declaration on 
27.2.1992, i.e. three weeks prior to discussion of the question in 
Parliament. This procedure was necessary owing to the schedule 
adhered to in the EC, for had Finland not communicated its 
desire to apply for membership before the meeting of EC foreign 
ministers held on 2.3.1992, measures could not have been taken 
to begin handling its application before the EC summit in Lisbon 
in June 1992. And if Finland's application had not been discussed 
at the Lisbon meeting, membership could not have been achieved 
until some time after 1996. This would have been against Finland's 
interests, as the EC had decided that its major defence policy 
decisions would be taken in that same year. It was important for 
Finland to be able to contribute to this developing defence 
dimension, especially since a unanimous decision was required, 
so that a small country such as Finland would have a relatively 
powerful say in the final outcome. 
Discussion of the foreign and security policy effects of EC 
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membership did not commence at once in 1992, although it is 
possible to gain a general understanding of the government's 
viewpoints on this matter by analysing its EC report and 
declaration, both published at the beginning of 1992. In simplified 
terms, it can be stated that the documents contained a model 
consisting of three elements: (1) active participation in the EC, (2) 
maintenance of stability in the north and (3) an independent 
national defence capability. 
The first element in the triangle was defined in the 
government's EC declaration in the following manner: "EC 
membership entails the acceptance of existing EC regulations 
and procedures, the level already achieved in political cooperation 
and the aims set out in the community's charter." In other words, 
Finland could not join the EC and simply choose the types of 
activity in which it wished to participate but would have to 
accept the fact that "the member countries are united by mutual 
solidarity and the promotion of common interests". The 
assumption that Finland would adopt an active role within the 
EC was admittedly based not so much on the government's 
declaration as on the country's custom of devoting itself 
wholeheartedly to the work of those international organisations 
in which it has been engaged, as has been evident in the United 
Nations, the CSCE, EFTA and the Nordic Council. 
The second basic element, stability in the Nordic area, was 
defined in the following manner: "The fundamental aim of 
[Finland's] policy is to maintain and promote stability and security 
in Northern Europe. This aim can be enhanced by developing 
relations with Russia, reinforcing cooperation with the Nordic 
Countries and creating a pattern of cooperation in the Baltic 
area". 
As far as the third element is concerned, it was said in the 
declaration that: "As a member of the EC, Finland would maintain 
an independent defence system which is credible in relation to 
the country's security needs and its environment." 
, The decision to apply for EC membership marked a 
historical change in the orientation of Finland's foreign policy, a 
change which verified Paasikivi's basic opinion of Finland as 
having to conform to the radical changes taking place in the 
balance of power in Europe. Being a small country, it simply 
could not proceed upstream but had to find its own course 
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through skilful downstream navigation, holding on to those things 
that were vital for its existence. 
The decision could have been expected to be an easy one as 
far as commercial policy was concerned, and in the end it was. It 
is interesting to note, however, that Finnish industry reacted to 
the application for EC membership in the same manner as it had 
done when Finland gained independence in 1917. It was evident 
then, for instance, that industry began to show support only 
when the Bolshevik revolution had made it impossible to continue 
trade with Russia, and 75 years later support for EC membership 
began to emerge only when the disintegration of the Soviet 
Union had undermined the old system of bilateral trade between 
the two countries. In their commercial report issued in January 
1992, the Confederation of Finnish Industries and the Federation 
of Finnish Employers communicated that they were in favour of 
EC membership on the grounds of competitive ability and export 
potential, for Finland faced severe competition on European 
markets and could obviously not rely on a revival of trade with 
Russia. 
The elections of 1994 
The presidential elections of 1994 took place during the time 
of transition in Finnish foreign and security policy. Finland had 
applied for membership of the European Union but had not yet 
concluded negotiations on the exact terms. Consequently the 
elections were expected to centre around this membership 
question. Politicians, newspapers and political analysts predicted 
that the final battle would be fought between a candidate who 
was a strong supporter of joining the European Union and one 
who was either opposed to membership or at least highly critical. 
This was not to be. The two candidates who advanced to 
the second round were both firmly committed to membership of 
the European Union and regarded full participation in European 
integration as the most appropriate response to changes in 
Finland's geopolitical circumstances.2s Elisabeth Rehn, the 
Minister of Defence, who captured 46% of the decisive second 
round vote, argued that membership of the European Union was 
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a natural continuation of Finland's historical Scandinavian 
orientation,29 while Martti Ahtisaari, a career diplomat, who 
eventually won the election, declared repeatedly that he did not 
want the border between Finland and Sweden to become the 
eastern frontier of the European Union. The one candidate who 
built his entire campaign on opposition to membership of the 
European Union, Keijo Korhonen, gained only a few percent of 
the votes in the first round, and Paavo Väyrynen, the former 
Foreign Minister, who advocated neutrality and made acceptance 
of membership conditional upon successful conclusion of the 
negotiations (and who later came out in opposition to membership 
because of the burden it would impose on Finnish agriculture), 
finished third and thus failed to make it into the second round. 
Once installed as President, Martti Ahtisaari continued to 
speak out strongly in favour of membership of the European 
Union. He stated unequivocally in his inaugural address that 
"enlargement of the European Union will promote our national 
well-being and security,"30 and during the seven months that 
preceded the referendum he took up the question of membership 
in his monthly visits to different parts of the country and in his 
meetings with foreign heads of state. His arguments for joining 
the European Union were conisely presented in a speech he 
made during his first state visit, to Sweden in April 1994. 
Speaking at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs, 
Ahtisaari stated that "European integration and the collapse of 
communism have opened the way for the evolution of a continent 
based on shared values and co-operation." As far as Norden was 
concerned, Ahtisaari hoped that "all the Nordic countries seeking 
membership will be able to enter the Union at the same time." 
He noted further that "Finland and Sweden share the assumption 
that, by developing the common foreign and security policy of 
the EU, we will create the best environment for closer cooperation 
between the Nordic Countries and northwestern Russia." And 
he added that "EU membership would mean the step which, in 
my opinion, would best ensure the permanent historical closeness 
of Finland and Sweden.""' The fact that Finland and Sweden 
signed the framework document of Partnership for Peace at a 
joint ceremony in May 1994 underlined that the two countries 
had indeed come very close to each other in matters of foreign 
and security policy. 
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Related to the issue of membership of the European Union 
was the question of who would represent Finland in the European 
Council. Two opposing camps formed on this question, those 
who thought that the President should represent Finland, in 
view of the stipulation in the constitution that the President shall 
be responsible for the conduct of Finland's foreign relations," 
and those who supported the Prime Minister, arguing that 
President Koivisto (1982-1994) had consistantly sought to 
strengthen parliamentarism at the expense of his own presidential 
powers. He had been fully backed by the political parties in this 
pursuit, and from this point of view, the argument ran, any 
decision to the contrary would mean recourse to the rigid 
presidential system of the past.33  
Although most of the political elite, including the Prime 
Minister, Esko Aho, were in favour of prime ministerial 
representation, the President was of the opinion that he would 
decide in each case whether he himself or the Prime Minister 
would lead the Finnish delegation. A compromise was finally 
offered by Max Jakobson, who as a result of his long, distinguished 
diplomatic career enjoyed the status of an elder statesman in 
Finnish political debate. Writing in Helsingin Sanomat, the leading 
Finnish daily, Jakobson argued that Finland should send both 
the President and the Prime Minister to the European Council. 
While he conceded that it would be pragmatically convenient to 
give the lead to the Prime Minister, he rejected this conclusion 
for historical and psychological reasons. "The change ahead of 
us is so great that it will try the psychological adaptability of the 
people. The world situation is chaotic and the future uncertain. It 
is not wise to start dismantling our traditional decision-making 
structure in foreign policy, for the people are used to it." In his 
view the President could direct foreign policy through the 
government, as President Koivisto had suggested, even if he 
himself attended meetings of the European Union.34 
Constitutional experts restricted themselves to pointing out that 
membership of the European Union would in any case necessitate 
a comprehensive review of the pertinent parts of the Finnish 
constitution. 
The debate lost some of its edge following Jakobson's 
intervention, possibly in response to opinion polls which showed 
that the people were reacting adversely to the sight of a squabble 
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over who would represent Finland in the EU before they had 
decided whether or not to join. After the referendum the 
compromise suggested by Jakobson was accepted as the starting 
point for Finnish representation. 
On 16th October 1994 the Finns voted in favour of 
membership of the European Union, although the result, 57% in 
favour and 43% against, was less emphatic than most of the 
newspapers had predicted. Nevertheless, it gave a strong enough 
mandate to Parliament to ratify Finland's membership with the 
required two-thirds majority. 
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3 FINLAND'S NEW GEOPOLITICAL 
POSITION 
Geopolitics has for a long time been an essential part of any 
discussion of Finland's international position. Towards the end 
of the 19th century statesmen sought to explain the country's 
autonomous status within the Russian Empire by resorting to 
geopolitical arguments, and in the 1920s and 1930s the Finns 
debated their foreign policy in terms of either a "border state" or 
a Scandinavian orientation. Correspondingly, it was the presumed 
permanence of the geopolitical circumstances that formed the 
rationale for Finland's policy of neutrality during the Cold War 
era. Against this background, it was only natural that a polemic 
on the new geopolitical realities should begin after the radical 
changes of 1989-90. 
The debate had already begun in 1990, with considerable 
discussion over the role of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation 
and Mutual Assistance, but it was only after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union that leading politicians began to allude to 
geopolitical arguments. The discussion was initiated on the 
political level by the Minister of Defence, Elisabeth Rehn, during 
her visit to Washington, when she stated in a speech to the 
National Press Club that Finland had reacted to the changes in 
her geopolitical position by applying for membership of the 
European Union.31 This statement sounded harmless enough, 
but it was not accepted by everyone. Paavo Väyrynen, self-
appointed guardian of Finland's policy of neutrality and still 
serving as Minister of Foreign Affairs at that time, did not agree 
with his colleague at all, and made it very clear to journalists that 
in his view Finland's geopolitical position had not changed.36 
Väyrynen's view was presumably based on the observation 
that the crucial factor in Finland's geopolitical position, her 
common boundary with the superpower Russia, had not altered 
in any way, whereas Rehn was setting out from the fact that such 
significant changes had taken place in political circumstances 
and the military balance of power that one could well assume 
that some geopolitical alteration had taken place. In a later speech 
she laid more stress on the magnitude of the change by noting 
that only three events within the last 150 years had had the same 
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impact, the Crimean War and the two World Wars. 
In order to determine the extent of the geopolitical change 
in the aftermath of the Soviet break-up, it is necessary to make a 
short excursion to the Cold War situation, after which it will be 
useful to establish the fundamentals of Finland's geopolitical 
position in the new era. 
Exit the Nordic Balance 
Security in northern Europe during the Cold War was often 
discussed in terms of the Nordic Balance, a concept developed in 
the 1960s by a Norwegian researcher, Arne Olav Brundtland. 
The idea was that there existed a military balance made up of 
qualified Norwegian and Danish participation in NATO (which 
meant no foreign bases and no nuclear weapons in peacetime), 
Sweden's neutrality based on strong defences, and "the special 
Soviet restraint in dealing with Finland". According to this theory, 
comparable possibilities existed for both the US and the Soviet 
Union "to neutralise any increased involvement by the other 
superpower, thus removing the incentive for any initiatives 
leading to increased tension in Northern Europe."37 
The concept of a Nordic Balance had been harshly criticised 
from various perspectives over the years.31 The Finns, for example, 
never accepted the theory because it seemed to equate Finland's 
Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance with 
the affiliation of Norway and Denmark to NATO. Nevertheless, 
the theory survived for decades as an important frame of reference 
for discussions of security in the region. 
The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and of the Soviet Union 
and the independence of the Baltic States effectively annulled the 
Nordic Balance theory. The international system of the Cold 
War, of which the Nordic Balance had been a subsystem, 
collapsed. Finland dissociated itself from the Treaty of Friendship, 
Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, and the Soviet Union was 
replaced by the Russian Federation. Sweden became eager to 
establish herself as a European power rather than a Scandinavian 
one, Norway began to keep a wary eye on the United States as its 
government started restructuring its military commitment to 
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Europe, and, most significantly, new stars emerged in the Nordic 
constellation: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania - and even Poland. 
The new geopolitical situation in the Nordic-Baltic region 
began to bear a resemblance to that of the 1920s and the 1930s. 
Firstly, Russia had become unstable, as had been the case in the 
interwar period, secondly, the independence of the Baltic States 
was a direct reminder of the interwar situation, and thirdly, the 
unification of Germany meant its return to the area of the Baltic 
Sea as a significant economic and political force. Fourthly, the 
collapse of the Warsaw Pact together with the independence of 
the Baltic States shifted the centre of gravity in the Baltic Sea area 
from the southern part, around the Danish Straits, to the north, 
towards the Gulf of Finland, where it had been during the interwar 
period. Lastly, the dissolution of the special Cold War relationship 
between the Soviet Union and Finland (symbolised by the FCMA 
Treaty) meant that Finland and Sweden found themselves in 
similar international positions. 
These changes revived a number of controversial issues 
from the interwar period. The Commander of the Finnish Navy, 
Admiral Sakari Visa, called for the remilitarisation of the Aland 
Islands, which had been demilitarised after the Crimean War in 
1856, and whose status had been debated anew every time the 
geopolitical situation had changed. In this sense the islands could 
be regarded simply as a barometer of geopolitical changes in the 
region. The Finnish government responded to the Admiral's 
suggestion by stating that it did not see any reason to alter the 
legal status of the Aland Islands. It is nevertheless notable that 
during his visit to the islands, President Koivisto left the door 
open for possible changes in the context of European integration 
by observing that this had a clear security dimension, in the light 
of which the status of the Aland Island would undoubtedly have 
to be reviewed.39 It is also worth mentioning that the Finnish 
armed forces are obliged to defend the Aland Islands in the same 
manner as all other parts of Finland, which means that adequate 
troops would have to be transported there in the event of a crisis. 
Another debate which harked back to the 1930s concerned 
the merits of Swedish-Finnish defence cooperation. Wilhelm 
Agrell, a Swedish researcher, and Bengt Gustafsson, the 
Commander-in-Chief of the Swedish defence forces both argued 
in favour of close military cooperation, while Elisabeth Rehn, as 
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the Finnish Minister of Defence, also spoke in favour of security 
and defence policy cooperation but refrained from suggesting 
any military alliance. The most detailed proposal came from 
Paavo Väyrynen, who left the government in 1993 to concentrate 
on running for the presidency. After failing in his attempt, he 
began to oppose Finland's plans to join the European Union, and 
as the de facto leader of the "No to the EU" camp, he wrote an 
article in the journal Nordisk Kontakt in which he outlined his 
proposal for a Nordic Community as an alternative to the 
European Union. His idea was that Sweden and Finland should 
remain neutral and that NATO should undertake to defend the 
air space of these countries in the case of war."0 How this 
arrangement could be implemented was not explained. The 
proposal has nevertheless lost its rationale as both Finland and 
Sweden have opted to join the European Union. 
Despite the similarities between the 1990s and the 1930s, 
the new geopolitical constellation was not a reproduction of the 
prewar situation. Instead of an expansionist Soviet Union, there 
emerged a Russian Federation that was committed to cooperation 
with the West, and instead of the weak, internally divided Finland 
that saw itself as a lonely outpost of Western civilisation in the 
1920s and 1930s, there was a politically stable nation beginning 
to seek closer links with Western Europe. At the same time, 
instead of an isolationist America we heard clear statements 
from the United States indicating that there was no intention of 
making a full withdrawal from Europe. And finally, instead of a 
fragmented and unstable Western Europe there emerged an 
integrated community that sought to project its political and 
economic stability eastward. 
The fundamentals of Finland's new position 
Although the significance of geopolitics depends on political, 
economic, social and technological developments, it may be useful 
to try and identify the most important geopolitical factors present 
in the post Cold War situation. Starting out from a wider, 
continental perspective, the Nordic-Baltic region forms the only 
area that directly links Russia with Western Europe. The only 
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alternative land and sea connection was through the Black Sea 
and Turkey, but this is less useful from the Russian point of view 
as Turkey is not likely to be as integrally linked with Western 
European institutions as the Nordic states. 
The second important geopolitical factor is that the Nordic-
Baltic region is situated between the Western geoeconomic area 
and the Eastern geopolitical one. In addition, the Western 
geoeconomic area is one in which traditional geopolitical issues 
such as the location of borders, access to the oceans, the ownership 
of raw materials and the sizes of populations no longer play very 
significant roles, having been by and large overcome by the 
creation of the Common Market and the establishment of the EU. 
In the absence of geopolitical considerations, geoeconomic issues 
become important: who has the shortest routes to the main 
markets, who can make best use of the proximity of low-wage 
countries, and so on. 
Traditional geopolitical issues still occupy a predominant 
position in the East. There are countless unresolved border 
questions within the territory of the Commonwealth of 
Independent States, there has been intense debate between Russia 
and the Ukraine over access to the Black Sea, and control over 
oil, gas and other resources is a constant subject of debate between 
the central power in Moscow and the regions. One consequence 
of this division into a geopolitical area and a geoeconomic one is 
that Finland's international position is "more geopolitical" than 
that of other western European countries. 
The third significant geopolitical factor in the Nordic-Baltic 
region has to do with great power spheres of influence and/or 
interest. These two concepts may coincide, but they are not the 
same thing. A sphere of influence refers here to political 
(pre)dominance, while a sphere of interest simply means that a 
great power has economic, political, security or other interests in 
the region. From the perspective of the great powers (or 
"influential international actors", which may be a more apt term) 
it can be argued that the Baltic-Nordic region is divided into 
three spheres of interest/influence. Firstly, there is the Russian 
sphere of interest and influence, which continues to be strong in 
the three Baltic States. In addition to the remnants of Soviet 
forces, such as retired officers or special troops remaining in 
these countries, the most conspicuous and most important 
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manifestation of this is the Kaliningrad area situated between 
Lithuania and Poland, which extends the sphere of military 
influence to areas that Russia would not otherwise have access 
to. 
Secondly, there is the EU sphere of interest/influence, which 
most obviously encompasses Sweden and Finland but has also 
extended to the Baltic states to a lesser degree. The future of this 
sphere of interest will depend on the development of a common 
foreign and security policy within the EU and on the progress 
made in trade relations between the European Union and Russia. 
It should be noted that of the members of the European Union, it 
is Germany that has the strongest geopolitical interest in the 
Baltic region, especially in the enhancement of Poland's 
geopolitical position. Great Britain, on the other hand, has the 
closest interest in the Atlantic coast of Scandinavia. 
Finally, there is the Atlantic - or American - sphere of 
interest/influence, which is felt most strongly in Norway on 
account of that country's membership of NATO, but also extends 
to Sweden and Finland and to some extent to the Baltic States as 
well. There is naturally also a strong American interest in Russia 
as such. This interest is based on the one hand on the existence of 
a substantial Russian nuclear arsenal in the Murmansk region 
and the question of how to prevent nuclear profileration, and on 
the other hand on the interest of the United States in supporting 
reform in Russia for the sake of strengthening democracy and 
freedom. 
The fourth fundamental geopolitical consideration in the 
region is the fact that no Western country is ready to extend 
military guarantees to the Baltic States in the foreseeable future. 
In this sense one can argue that they have inherited Finland's 
postwar geopolitical position, although with a few qualifications. 
Firstly, postwar Finland enjoyed a degree of "deterrence credit" 
vis-å-vis the Soviet Union because it had succesfully repelled 
Soviet attempts at occupation during the war. No such deterrence 
credit exists in contemporary Russian-Baltic relations. Secondly, 
while Finland was left outside Western institutions after the war 
(Finland could not receive Marshall Aid, for example, because of 
Soviet objections), the Baltic States are included in numerous 
European cooperative structures. 
It should be noted in addition that the individual Baltic 
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States differ significantly one from another in many respects: 
language, traditions, speed of reforms etc. There are even 
differences in their strategic positions, as Lithuania is affected by 
developments in the Kaliningrad region, whereas Estonia's 
position is determined more by its proximity to St. Petersburg.`" 
Even so, looked at from the point of view of geopolitical 
development in the USA-EU-Russian Federation context, they 
may be treated as forming one geopolitical region. 
The Baltic connection 
Estonia is the closest of the Baltic States to Finland in terms 
of geography, culture, language and history. In fact it is often the 
case that when a Finn speaks about the Baltic States in the plural 
he actually means Estonia alone. This is natural, since Tallinn is 
only approximately 80 km (50 miles) away from Helsinki across 
the Gulf of Finland, so that on a good day it takes just over an 
hour by hydrofoil to travel from the capital of Finland to that of 
Estonia. 
This has not always been so, for there were no speedy 
ferries or air connections between Finland and Estonia during 
the Cold War, visas were difficult to obtain and official ties were 
non-existent. Although the Finnish government accepted Estonia's 
incorporation into the Soviet Union as a fact, it had never 
withdrawn its recognition of the independent Republic of Estonia 
as declared in 1919. This is nothing for the Finns to feel proud 
about, of course, for if the Soviet Union had demanded that 
Finland retract her earlier recognition of Estonia, she would 
undoubtedly have complied. Nevertheless, the fact that there 
was an unrevoked declaration of recognition for Estonia in the 
archives of the Foreign Ministry meant that Finland did not have 
to recognise the country's independence in 1991. It was sufficient 
for the government to state that de facto relations between Finland 
and Estonia now corresponded to the de jure relations that had 
always existed. 
The struggle for the independence of Estonia had an impact 
on the way in which the Finns discussed their own history. The 
fact that Finland had been able to avoid the fate of its Baltic 
neighbours in 1939 and 1944 was contemplated once again in 
newspapers, books and even films, and a film entitled The Winter 
War drew the largest crowds to Finnish cinemas at that time. 
From a historical point of view, it became increasingly clear that 
Finland's ability to distance herself from the Baltic States had 
been one of the key determinants of her independence and 
security. This differentiation had already taken place during the 
19th century, when Finland was an autonomous Grand Duchy of 
Russia while the Baltic States were fully incorporated into it. 
During the Cold War, Finland again found herself in a radically 
different position from her southern neighbours. 
Finland's policy towards the Baltic States during the late 
1980s and early 1990s hinged upon three main principles: to 
promote their independence (this emerged as a conspicuous 
policy goal only after the failed Moscow putsch of August 1991), 
to avoid harming Helsinki-Moscow relations, and to prevent 
conflict between Moscow and the Baltic States themselves. To 
admit that the second of these principles was the overriding one 
does not mean that the other two did not exist. They certainly 
did, even though Finland was not as vocal in its support for the 
Baltic States during their struggle for independence as some 
other countries were. 
Sweden, for example, adopted much more vociferous tones 
both during the Baltic struggle for independence and during the 
debate over the withdrawal of Russian troops in 1992-1994. The 
Swedish Prime Minister, Carl Bildt, went as far as to state that it 
was not altogether clear that Sweden could remain neutral if the 
Baltic States were attacked. He indicated that Sweden would not 
intervene militarily, but that the Swedish government would use 
strong political and economic instruments to help the Baltic 
countries.42 This statement was heavily criticised by the leader of 
the opposition, Ingvar Carlsson. After the change of government 
in October 1994, Carlsson stated that, contrary to what Carl Bildt 
had said, Sweden would remain neutral in the case of a crisis in 
the Baltic Sea area. 
Finland, on the other hand, never gave the Baltic States any 
reason to believe that it would help them significantly if a crisis 
were to arise. The tacit argument was that Finland was not 
strong enough to guarantee the security of Estonia, not to mention 
the other Baltic States, and to try to do so would only worsen its 
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own security. Consequently, the most Finland could do was to 
help Estonia to integrate itself economically and politically with 
Western Europe. 
Even though Finland was not interested in any form of 
active military cooperation with the Baltic States, it began to 
contribute to the training of Estonian officers. In the same vein as 
Finnish officers attend military academies in foreign countries, 
Estonian officers started to attend Finnish military schools. Thus 
there were altogether about thirty officers and non-commissioned 
officers in training in Finland each year. 
In addition to Estonian officers being trained in Finland, a 
number of retired Finnish officers and reserve officers travelled 
to Estonia in the early and mid-1990s to work in advisory roles, 
having no connection with the Finnish government. In addition, 
members of Finnish officers' clubs went to Estonia in groups of 
between three and five to provide basic training. 
It is very likely that Finland's close ties with Estonia will 
develop even further as the result of Finland's joining the 
European Union, and the link between Helsinki and Tallinn in 
particular is likely to become a very dynamic cultural and 
economic connection. 
Russia - Finland's 'new' neighbour 
When speaking of the significance of Russia for Finnish 
security, most Finns are reminded of the advice given by President 
J.K. Paasikivi (1946-56): "Gentlemen, please take a look at the 
map!" The geographical map still looks much the same, but the 
political landscape has changed entirely. Instead of an 
expansionist, Communist neighbour, Finland now shares a border 
with a Russia that is struggling towards political reforms and a 
market economy. 
'Although the reforms are well on their way, Russia has 
plenty of rough waters lying ahead. We may yet see further 
fragmentation, a move towards a more authoritarian form of 
government, or step by step progression towards economic 
stability and a democratic form of government. In any event, it 
will take decades, not years, for Russia to settle comfortably into 
its new role, whatever this may prove to be. 
The fact that the reconstruction of Russia will take a long 
time (it took about 20 years after the revolution of 1917 before the 
new political order was firmly installed) poses a problem of 
analysis for the Finnish government. This problem is that one 
cannot draw any far reaching conclusions from the situation in 
Moscow on any particular day. One has to rely on a broader 
interpretation of what is and is not possible in post-Communist 
Russia. 
Gradual progress towards democracy and a market 
economy is certainly a possibility, and if this trend continues it 
will place Finland in a favourable position politically and 
economically, as her geographical location (with a common 
boundary of 1300 kilometres) and long history of successful 
trade relations will give her an advantage over other Western 
countries. In this positive scenario it would be possible for Finland 
to regain some of the Russian markets that she has lost as a 
consequence of the collapse of the Soviet economy. But even 
under favourable conditions it will take a long time to bring 
Finnish-Russian trade to anywhere near the level at which it was 
during the Cold War, when the Soviet Union accounted for 
almost a quarter of Finland's external trade. The proportion had 
fallen to only about three percent by 1993, although it began to 
grow again in 1994. 
The economic well-being of Russia is not merely a question 
of trade for Finland, however, as a lowering of the vast economic 
and social divide that currently exists between the two countries 
is badly needed for reasons of stability. This divide is not visible 
to people visiting the frontier region because there are vast areas 
on the Russian side of the border that are almost entirely 
uninhabited, but it is evident that the border still signifies an 
abrupt change in terms of political systems, economic situation, 
religion, language and size of population. Unless this divide is 
alleviated in the long run, it may turn out to be a cause of 
instability in the region. 
Other, less optimistic scenarios are also possible. These 
include the eventuality of a deterioration in relations between 
Russia and the West (either the EU or the United States or both). 
In such a case Finland's geographical position would be a less 
comfortable one. This possibility calls for a further look at 
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Finland's geopolitical location. 
Questions of military strategy are not decisive in the 
northern part of Europe at the present moment. Non-military 
issues and threats are more central to the development of the 
Baltic Sea region than are the deployment and structures of 
military forces. These non-military uncertainties include 
environmental threats, the possibility of a nuclear accident and 
the theoretical (although very unlikely) possibility of mass 
migration. These risks cannot be overcome without cooperation 
between Russia and the West. This is why Finland has a national 
stake in helping to construct a new code of East-West relations. 
The military situation in the Baltic has changed radically. 
The Russian navy has withdrawn from the Baltic States and will 
have to patrol the Baltic Sea from two points in the future: 
Kaliningrad and Kronstadt (near St. Petersburg). These naval 
bases are separated by a distance of approximately 540 nautical 
miles (1000 km or 625 land miles). Russian air defences and their 
early warning system are being relocated east of Estonia, while 
at the same time Germany has taken over the naval bases in the 
former area of East Germany and has the potential to build up a 
more prominant presence in the Baltic. 
The Baltic States are working very hard to establish credible 
control over their territorial waters and air space. There are 
visible improvements, e.g. in the control of Estonian territorial 
waters, but all three states are having great difficulties in 
establishing an air control system which will serve both civilian 
and defence purposes. 
The most sensitive security issue in the Baltic region is the 
relationship between Estonia and Russia. In addition to the two 
remaining military installations, Skrunda radar station in Latvia 
and the Paldiski nuclear submarine reactor in Estonia, the 
dismountling of which was begun in early 1994, there is an 
unresolved question concerning the rights of Russian nationals 
in the Baltic states. Unless this question is resolved to the 
satisfaction of all parties it may have repercussions for the stability 
of the region. 
The long border with Russia has not caused any special 
problems for Finland. The adjacent Russian areas are among the 
most stable in the whole of Russia. There are no civil wars, nor 
autonomous areas seeking independence, and the control 
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maintained by the Russian border guards is good. The 
strategically important Murmansk region, which is located next 
to Finnish Lapland, is also a very stable area. 
Nevertheless, there has been a numerical build-up of 
Russian troops along the Finnish border as a result of the 
withdrawal from the former Warsaw Pact countries and from 
the Baltic States. At the moment there are more than 300 000 men 
stationed in the Leningrad military district, although not of them 
all under the command of that district, since the figure includes 
all categories of troops (army, strategic air force, air defence, 
navy and marines), some of which are directly responsible to the 
supreme command of the Russian defence forces and others are 
under navy command. 
The quantity and quality of the military hardware located 
close to the Finnish border has also increased. In 1994 there were 
approximately 800 combat aircraft in the Leningrad military 
district and just over 500 helicopters (excluding those of the 
border guard detachments), while the number of tanks was 
around 1500. The improvement in the quality of the material 
located here has been a result of both the CFE agreement and the 
withdrawal of the forces from Central Europe. Given an 
abundance of equipment, it was natural to place the best of it in 
the strategically important Leningrad district. 
Although these Russian troops do not constitute a threat to 
Finland, it is quite clear that in the long run Finland would not 
like to see such a dense concentration of military power along its 
borders. The Russians have stated that the new troops are there 
only on a temporary basis, and an official exchange of information 
concerning them has started between the two governments. 
The status of Karelia (the area that Finland had to cede to 
the Soviet Union at the end of the last war) was debated to some 
extent in the early 1990s. The most active participants in this 
were largely elderly people who had had to leave their homes in 
the area as a result of the war. The idea did not catch on, however, 
and various opinion polls conducted between 1992 and 1994 
showed that only about 25% of the Finns were in favour of 
opening official negotiations on the subject. Consequently it seems 
unlikely that the question will be taken up officially, and the 
Presidents of both Finland and Russia have denied the existence 
of such an issue. From a political point of view it would make no 
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sense whatsoever to try and open negotiations on these ceded 
territories. Firstly, the Russians would be sure to refuse to make 
any concessions, and secondly, Finland has succeeded in 
distancing herself from all countries that have open border 
questions and/or difficult minority problems and it would be 
unwise voluntarily to rejoin the group of those that have such 
problems. 
Finland's decision to join the European Union has not been 
questioned by the Russians. Indeed, some of the leading 
politicians have openly encouraged it, provided that the 
enlargement of the Union does not lead to a new division in 
Europe in which Russia would become an outsider. On the other 
hand, Russian opposition to the enlargement of NATO into 
eastern Central Europe and the Baltic States is quite unambiguous. 
There are some Russian nationalists, however, who have called 
for a return to pre-First World War boundaries, which would 
mean annexation of the Baltic States, Poland and Finland, for 
example, but fortunately these views represent a small minority 
in the Russian political establishment. 
All in all, it must be remembered that Finland's relations 
with post-Communist Russia now stand on a firm basis and that 
political, cultural and economic relations have developed 
favourably. This is important, as Finland's border is also the 
eastern border of the European Union. 
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4 FINLAND'S FOREIGN AND DEFENCE 
POLICY AFTER NEUTRALITY 
Finland's accession to the European Union began a new 
phase in the country's history, consolidating its position in 
Scandinavia and Europe. At the same time, membership offered 
a new platform for cooperation with Russia and the Baltic States. 
In terms of foreign and security policy, membership combined 
old themes with new possibilities. The old themes included 
Finland's commitment to strengthening cooperative security in 
the context of the CSCE and the United Nations, and the new 
possibilities included the development of the northern dimension 
of the Union's common foreign and security policy. 
Ahtisaari as President, 1994- 
During the Cold War, Finland had repeatedly emphasised 
the predictable and stable nature of its foreign policy, to the 
extent that instead of using the simple term "foreign policy", 
most Finns preferred to speak of a "line in foreign policy". The 
purpose of this was to hint that Finland's external policies were 
not affected by temporary fluctuations in international relations. 
This meant, of course, that after the Cold War was over many 
Finns were in a state of considerable consternation because of the 
loss of these clear definitions and predictable patterns. They 
demanded to know whether Finland was neutral, non-aligned, 
politically aligned or what was the proper description of their 
country's foreign policy. 
The government responded to these pressures by 
emphasising the transitory nature of international relations and 
by introducing two key concepts: "military non-alignment" and 
"credible national defence". However, instead of talking about 
remaining militarily non-aligned indefinitely, it insisted that 
Finland was "not looking for external security guarantees". The 
message was that while Finland was willing to participate in 
security integration, this participation was not to be viewed in 
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traditional terms. The debate was not between neutrality and 
military alignment but between participation and non-
participation in the development of a system of common security. 
Finland's new foreign policy "line" began in the autumn of 
1990, with a unilateral reinterpretation of two post-war treaties 
which had been the cornerstones of her foreign policy, the FCMA 
Treaty and the Paris Peace Treaty. Since then steps have been 
taken towards participation in the pursuit for a common, 
cooperative security arrangement. Finland became an observer 
in the NACC in 1992, applied for membership of the European 
Union in March 1992, began a dialogue with the WEU in 1993 
and joined the Partnership for Peace Programme in the spring of 
1994. The announcement by Prime Minister Esko Aho in October 
1994 that Finland would join the Western European Union as an 
observer as soon as she became a member of the European Union 
was in line with this new emphasis on participation and 
cooperative security. At the same time, however, he restated the 
fact that membership of a military alliance was neither a goal of 
Finnish foreign policy nor a necessary outcome of the country's 
observer status in the WEU.43  
Most of the steps to establish Finland's new foreign policy 
were taken during President Koivisto's term of office, but it was 
only during the Ahtisaari presidency that a clear foreign and 
security policy doctrine began to emerge. Central to this doctrine 
was a set of assumptions concerning the nature of security and 
the dynamics of international relations. 
One of the first premises in President Ahtisaari's foreign 
policy doctrine was that the time of static security models was 
over. Instead of trying to prevent change, the proper goal was to 
control it, to move from static to dynamic stability. This theme 
was common to most of his recommendations, ranging from the 
need to enlarge the membership of the European Union to the 
constructive management of worldwide economic competition. 
The second assumption behind Ahtisaari's foreign policy 
thinking was that the concept of security had broadened to include 
economic, social and environmental questions. Speaking at the 
annual meeting of the National Defence Courses, he stated that 
"economic and technological competitiveness will largely decide 
how well each country will succeed in this new order. The more 
conventional idea of the prime importance of military might in 
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assessing relations between states must be set against this historic 
change." 4' A few months later he noted that membership of the 
European Union would require a readiness "to develop security 
as a broad concept, to weigh its alternatives and to define it."45  
The third premise behind Ahtisaari's doctrine was that the 
end of the Cold War and the intensification of European 
integration had together transformed international relations in 
Europe and worldwide. This transmutation had implications for 
the nature of international relations and for the division of labour 
between large and small nations. 
As far as the nature of international relations was concerned, 
Ahtisaari saw the end of traditional power politics. "In fact, this 
century has been one major upheaval following another, of 
breaking free from the system of national states, the system that 
bred power politics." The goal was to prevent "a return to a 
Europe of national states where disputes were settled by wars 
and power politics."46 Instead, Europe should "gradually form a 
security area in which the defence systems would make war 
between the countries in the region or threats of military action 
impossible." This was a distant goal, however, since "the 
significance of geopolitics will not disappear as rapidly as the 
media would have us believe."47 
If the withering away of the national state was one side of 
Ahtisaari's coin, then the growing importance of European 
integration was the other. On the European level he saw 
integration as the best guarantee of national and common security. 
Speaking to foreign diplomats at his inauguration on ist March 
1994, he noted that "the enlargement of the European Union is 
essential in the pursuit of greater stability in Europe as a whole." 
Later he developed the theme further. Speaking about European 
and Finnish security, he noted that "it is the enlargement of the 
European Union that can best safeguard the development of the 
European lifestyle in a more human direction. Enlargement will 
prevent protectionism, isolationism and military competition. 
Integration as such will create a new kind of security guarantee, 
which membership of the EU will be able to offer us 
immediately."48 
The end of the Cold War had in Ahtisaari's view altered 
the division of labour between small and large states, and had 
created a multilayered network of international relations 
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consisting of new centres of power and new levels of political 
authority.} 
On the division of labour between states of different sizes, 
Ahtisaari pointed out that "no single state today wishes to carry 
the burden of the world on its shoulders like Atlas in Greek 
mythology. Now the burden has to be shared between big and 
small states alike, so that none of them tires or is exhausted 
under the weight."50 Speaking specifically about Finland in this 
new context, he noted that "most international problems can 
only be solved through strengthening cooperation between states 
and peoples... In these efforts there are neither big nor small 
states; there are only states that are willing or unwilling to 
cooperate. My country wishes to act strongly among those willing 
to cooperate."51  
In Ahtisaari's view there already existed four centres of 
economic and political power: "The development of the world 
economy is drastically reforming the world economic and political 
order. In addition to the United States, Japan and the European 
Union, south-eastern and eastern Asia is emerging as a significant 
economic power." This was not the entire picture, however, 
because "the Russian economy will inevitably improve at some 
point." The new situation posed challenges for the international 
community. In Ahtisaari's view the most important task on the 
global level was to manage the economic, cultural and political 
competition between new centres of power in such a fashion as 
to prevent it from becoming military in nature.51  
In addition to global relations, Ahtisaari saw two other 
levels of political authority: continental and regional. In the 
continental context, European integration and the building of a 
European security area based on cooperation and common 
security were the main ingredients of his vision. In the regional 
context, cooperation with Sweden, the Baltic States and Russia 
formed the framework for Finland's activity. 
The central theme in Ahtisaari's regional vision was a strong 
emphasis on Russia. While relations with the Soviet Union had 
been conducted between two centres, Moscow and Helsinki, 
Ahtisaari wanted to emphasise the new regional aspect of the 
Russian-Finnish relationship. "Russia is also a Russia of regions. 
St.Petersburg and its surrounding areas, Karelia and Kola will 
have greater opportunities for economic and cultural ties with 
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the Nordic Countries."53 During his visit to Oslo in October 1994 
he returned to this theme, noting that Norwegian initiatives in 
furthering regional cooperation with Russia in the context of the 
newly formed Barents Sea Council were highly commendable."' 
In a visit to Tartu University in Estonia, he spoke extensively 
about the role of small states, observing that "each state today 
must find its place within a regional, continental and global 
context. It is increasingly clear that the smaller countries of the 
Baltic Sea region share the same kind of position in world politics." 
Furthermore, he was prepared to state that "the Nordic Countries 
have a well-established tradition and long experience of their 
own successful cooperation to offer the Baltic Sea region as a 
model." s' 
Part of Ahtisaari's regional and continental vision was close 
cooperation between Finland and Sweden. As previously noted, 
Prime Minister Carl Bildt of Sweden and President Ahtisaari had 
agreed that "the basic requirements of the foreign and security 
policies of both Sweden and Finland are closer today than ever 
before in the modern era." The question that they left unanswered 
was what these basic requirements were. 
One can deduce from an analysis of Ahtisaari's foreign 
policy statements that there were three or four basic requirements 
that brought Finland and Sweden into ever closer cooperation in 
the post-Cold War era. Firstly, there was their common desire to 
maintain stability in the Nordic area, for which membership of 
the European Union was seen as an essential precondition. Both 
Ahtisaari and Bildt argued that once inside the European Union, 
Finland and Sweden would strive to attract EU interest to issues 
affecting northern Europe and to channel EU resources there - 
i.e. to give the Union a northern dimension. 
Secondly, there was the wish to help the Baltic States 
approach Europe. Both Sweden and Finland stated repeatedly 
that they advocated EU membership for Estonia and the other 
Baltic countries at the earliest possible moment. According to 
Ahtisåari, a realistic timetable might be the early years of the 
next century. Much would, of course, depend on internal 
developments in the Baltic States; and much would also depend 
on the Russian-Baltic relationship. Nevertheless, it is quite clear 
that if Finland and Sweden had not become members of the 
European Union they would not have been able to promote 
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Baltic links with the European Union. 
A third requirement that brought Finland and Sweden 
closer to each other was the historical mission to contribute to 
the building of a new relationship between Russia and Europe. 
President Ahtisaari stated that "supporting change in Russia, 
cooperating with the Russians, and linking Russia firmly into a 
common European security region are objectives that Finland 
and other Nordic countries can help to attain." The new Swedish 
Prime Minister, Ingvar Carlsson, signalled agreement with this 
view. 
Lastly, Sweden and Finland have declared an interest in 
cooperating on environmental issues. In 1994 there were still 
ten old Soviet-built nuclear power plants, two research reactors 
and roughly two hundred reactors in submarines and ice-
breakers in the vicinity of Finland. Guaranteeing the safe 
operation of these was seen as a formidable challenge for Russian 
specialists, and it was clearly in the interests of Sweden and 
Finland, and indeed of the entire EU, to assist the Russians in 
their efforts. 
Another environmental project for which joint efforts by 
members of the European Union was a necessary precondition 
was cleaning of the Baltic Sea. Planning for such an effort had 
began long before Finland's accession to the European Union. 
The White Paper of the European Commission published in 
1993 indicated that this environmental rescue operation could 
qualify for substantial support from the budget of the European 
Union. If successful, it could make the beautiful beaches of 
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania very attractive to tourists from 
Central Europe - not to mention the intrinsic value of a cleaner 
environment. 
During the Cold War period Sweden and Finland had 
played exaggerated international roles relative to their size and 
population. Now these countries are seeking to find new roles 
in a -changed international environment. Because of their 
geopolitical position next to Russia and the Baltic States it may 
turn out that they will again adopt significant positions. Much 
will depend on how well they can seize the opportunities offered 
by the common foreign and security policy of the European 
Union. 
Finland's defence policy 
Joining the European Union did not alter the role of the 
Finnish defence forces, but it did provide a new political and 
geopolitical framework for the planning of defence policy. In the 
new situation this consisted of two collateral aspects: the 
continued importance of a credible national defence and the 
opening of the door to participation in international operations 
aimed at strengthening common security. 
In order to explain the changes in Finland's defence policy 
between the Cold War and after, a short reiteration of the Cold 
War situation is required. Finnish defence policy at that time 
consisted of two layers. Firstly, the country emphasised its 
commitment to the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual 
Assistance. This meant that the threat scenario described in the 
Treaty, "an attack by Germany or a country allied with it", was 
accepted as part of Finnish defence policy doctrine. This 
declaratory level (together with such arrangements as signalled 
support for it) formed a dimension that can be termed "modernist 
defence policy". It was modernist because it was not based on 
the traditional view that only the Soviet Union posed a threat to 
Finnish security. This declaratory policy had gradually developed 
over the years, so that by the 1980s it had come to represent a 
state of "symmetrical defence" in which both the eastern and 
western threat scenarios were taken into account - even though 
no concrete threat scenarios were mentioned in Finnish foreign 
or defence policy statements. On the level of military planning 
the threat scenario was entirely different. Here the starting point 
was an attack by the Soviet Union with the objective of occupying 
the country, a line of thinking which, on account of the obvious 
connection with the age-old view that the only possible enemy is 
Russia, can be termed "traditionalist". As time went by, defence 
planning came to be more in harmony with the declaratory 
policy, however, as Finland developed its capabilities to defend 
itself against western attacks. Improvements were made in air 
defence and surveillance, in the defence of Lapland and in the 
surveillance and defence of Finnish territorial waters.56 But even 
so, the greatest emphasis was always placed on the army and its 
capabilities for defending the country in accordance with the 
traditional threat scenario. 
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When the Cold War came to an end, Finland was compelled 
to change its declaratory defence policy. With the FCMA Treaty 
gone, the same arguments no longer applied, and with the threat 
of a great European war gone, the defence forces had to change 
the foundations of their planning. It was no longer possible to 
build on the concept of marginal defence - the idea that Finland 
could be drawn into hostilities only in the context of a major 
European war, a situation in which the enemy would only have 
marginal forces available with which to attack Finland. Nor was 
it possible to rely on the functioning of the nuclear deterrent 
between the superpowers. 
Finland began to react on the declaratory level in 1990. The 
first indication of a change was a statement by Vice-Admiral Jan 
Klenberg at the CSCE doctrine seminar in Vienna. Instead of 
repeating the old formulae, Klenberg stated that the planning of 
Finnish defence was based on three threat scenarios: an attack 
aimed at occupying the country, an attack aimed at making use 
of part of the territory of Finland, and an attempt to subjugate 
the leadership of the state.57 The second step in the transformation 
of the declaratory defence policy was an analysis by the leading 
generals that joining the European Union did not endanger 
Finnish security." As soon as Finland applied for membership, 
the President, as supreme commander of the defence forces, 
declared that the country was ready to accept the Maastricht 
Treaty, including its provisions concerning a common foreign 
and defence policy. Since the goal of the European Union was 
the development of a common defence system, this statement 
meant that Finland was ready to abandon the notion of 
symmetrical defence. The third declaratory step was an Order of 
the Day issued by the Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Klenberg, 
in the summer of 1993, in which he emphasised the need for a 
credible national defence but left the door open to international 
military cooperation. "An independent defence cannot be based 
on foreign help even if it must be capable of international 
cooperation on an equal footing."59 This statement was only 
natural, since Finnish officers were already taking part in seminars 
in the context of NACC. Cooperation was further intensified 
later when Finland joined the Partnership for Peace programme. 
At the same time as these changes were taking place, the 
role of the Ministry of Defence was becoming much more 
important than it had been during the Cold War. Elisabeth Rehn, 
who started as Minister in June 1990, was instrumental in bringing 
this about. Rehn was not the prime mover in effecting changes to 
Finnish security policy - credit for that must be given to the 
President at the time, Mauno Koivisto - but she was undoubtedly 
a powerful force acting in that direction. It was she who outlined 
Finland's new position in the changing world, established high-
level international relations and set in motion numerous reforms 
within the defence administration. But most important of all, she 
altered Finland's whole defence policy culture, 'demystifying' 
the discussion of defence and security affairs and demonstrating 
that a person coming from outside the security establishment 
could understand questions of the mobilization of forces, peace-
keeping operations, fighter aircraft and disarmament treaties 
and could carry on an intelligent discussion on these subjects 
and make up her own mind on what was the best alternative 
from the perspective of Finnish defence policy. This meant in 
turn that she was able to raise the interest of the general public in 
defence matters. 
Prior to this facelift brought about by Elisabeth Rehn there 
had been few politicians interested in the defence portfolio, 
certainly not from the major parties. The reason was quite simply 
that the position was not regarded as a significant one. It was the 
permanent undersecretary who controlled defence spending and 
day-to-day affairs and the generals who were responsible for the 
country's defence and for briefing politicians on the military's 
most urgent needs. High-level policy decisions had been taken at 
the President's office, in his home or at the Foreign Ministry, 
while the security of the country's borders was the province of 
the Ministry of Internal Affairs. A Minister of Defence was needed 
chiefly for making official visits and inspections and for answering 
questions in Parliament - but for little else. 
Rehn's appointment did not transform the position 
overnight. The parliamentary defence committees first set up in 
the 1970s had created a foundation for the long-term development 
of defence policy, and participation in the CSCE process required 
a high level of knowhow on the part of officers, thus bringing the 
defence forces closer to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Changes 
in the status of the Ministry of Defence had begun to be apparent 
in the 1980s, however, as it adopted a more open, consultative 
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attitude. Thus, when Rehn arrived at the Ministry of Defence in 
summer 1990 all the ingredients for a raising of the ministry's 
profile already existed. 
From the very beginning Elisabeth Rehn's numerous 
speeches constituted an important part of Finland's new foreign 
and security policy. In her very first official speech, in June 1990, 
she raised the question of women taking part in peace-keeping 
missions. This topic was by no means a new one, but had been 
discussed on and off for about ten years to no avail. A report on 
the subject had been produced by the Ministry of Defence in 
1982, and the government had proposed in 1983 that the word 
"man" in the law on the defence forces' peace-keeping operations 
should be altered to "person". This change had been approved 
by Parliament the following year, but no further measures had 
been taken up to the time of Rehn's speech. Her recommendations 
nevertheless met with an enthusiastic response in the form of 
letters to newspapers and statements by voluntary organizations. 
Eventually six thousand women applied for entry to the peace-
keeping force, and 34 were accepted. 
Once this step had been taken, new discussions arose on 
the possibility of voluntary national service for women. Rehn 
was not in favour of this at first, as, having commissioned an 
investigation into the subject, she noted that it was difficult to 
find any reason why women should be prevented from making a 
career in the defence forces if they were so inclined. The existing 
situation was that there were some three thousand women already 
serving in various expert capacities who had no prospects of 
advancement. 
Another theme which aroused discussion was the place in 
the nation's memory afforded to those officers and civilians who 
had been involved in establishing caches of arms after the last 
war. Rehn took up this subject in her speech at the opening of the 
National Defence Course in March 1992, when she began by 
observing that the general increase in openness in Finnish society 
allowed this episode to be recalled to mind. "The issue of the 
arms caches led to the questioning and arrest of thousands of 
ordinary, patriotic citizens. In order to demonstrate their guilt, a 
retrospective law was passed of a kind that was without precedent 
in our judicial system, and the outcome was that almost 1500 
people who had lived blameless lives up to that time were 
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committed to prison." Since the planning and implementation of 
the arms cache operation had been a purely military precaution, 
Rehn was of the opinion that these sentences could in no way be 
justified. "As I understand it, those who helped to hide the arms 
were doing no more than what was their duty at the time. I don't 
see that bringing the matter up at the present time is a question 
of restoring their reputation but simply of acknowledging the 
facts." 
National defence and participation in common defence 
Although rapid changes took place in Finland's foreign and 
security policy in the early 1990s, the pace of change in the 
armed forces was much slower. Modernization of its command 
systems and communications was undertaken in the early years 
of the decade, when a new division of the country into military 
areas was introduced, and purchases were made to improve the 
army's fire-power and mobility, but the basic tenets of territorial 
defence remained as they were. A new fleet of F/A 18 Hornet 
fighter aircraft was purchased to replace the ageing Draken and 
MIG-21 planes, and some garrisons were merged to improve 
efficiency. The overpowering theme for the period was 
nevertheless the lack of money. 
The Finnish defence budget has traditionally been around 
1.5% of the GNP, and this amount had been sufficient throughout 
the 1980s since the economy was growing rapidly. Then, by 1991, 
the country was hit by the worst economic recession in peacetime 
history. This meant that the defence budget contracted for three 
consecutive years, the cumulative drop over the period 1992-
1995 being about 10%. At the same time a large proportion of the 
defence budget was tied up in the purchase of the new fighter 
aircraft. The end result was that considerable savings had to be 
made in operational expenses and in other purchases. In fact the 
army's situation would have been very difficult indeed without 
the opportunity to buy relatively inexpensive material, including 
artillery pieces, tanks and ammunition, from the stock of the 
now defunct East German army. 
One of the most problematic areas in which savings had to 
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be made was refresher training. The annual numbers of reservists 
called up for these exercises had to be reduced from 50 000 to 
30 000, which had an immediate impact on the level of 
preparedness of the territorial defence system. 
Finland has a trained reserve of about one million men, 
although the wartime strength of the armed forces is about half 
that amount, the army consisting of 460 000 men, the air force 
30 000 and the navy about 12 000. The peacetime strength of the 
army is 28 000 men, of whom 22 000 are conscripts, that of the 
navy 3000 (1500 conscripts) and that of the air force 4500 (1500 
conscripts). A new addition comprises women officers and non-
commissioned officers, whose wartime duties are not restricted 
by law. 
The decision to purchase the new fighter aircraft was a 
significant one from two points of view. Firstly, it was the first 
time that Finland had procured American interceptor aircraft 
since the Winter War, and secondly, the government decided to 
go through with the deal despite the serious economic depression. 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs commissioned a book on 
the history of Finnish peacekeeping to be published in 1995. The 
book is symbolic for two reasons. Firstly, peacekeeping was a 
very central element in the Finnish policy of neutrality during 
the Cold War, and secondly, by the time of publication both the 
Finnish policy of neutrality and traditional peacekeeping had 
come to an end. Finland was preparing to join the European 
Union and the United Nations was searching for new ways and 
means to resolve world crises. 
Much had changed since the Cold War. In those days the 
division of labour between small states and major powers was a 
clear one: the latter took care of grave issues such as the nuclear 
deterrent and massive retaliation and the small states were 
responsible for national defence and peacekeeping under the 
auspices of the United Nations. By the mid-1990s this tidy division 
no longer existed. NATO was moving into peacekeeping, and 
peacekeeping itself was in search of a new character. 
Culture and attitude are extremely important in questions 
of peacekeeping and crisis management. Indeed, it seems that in 
peace support missions the great divide does not run between 
NATO members and non-members but between countries of 
different cultures and with different attitudes concerning the use 
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of military force. This culture and attitude is very often a function 
of the size of the country, but not always. On the other hand, it is 
very much a product of historical experiences. One good example 
of this is Denmark. A comprehensive study of Danish foreign 
policy over two centuries60 shows quite convincingly that, as a 
once great European power that had suffered bitter experiences 
in continental wars, Denmark had developed an aversion to 
entanglements in military affairs not directly linked with its own 
national security. This, the author claims, explain Danish foreign 
policy during the Cold War, a policy that sometimes sought to 
distance the country from the hard core of the military guarantee 
that NATO was offering. Some observers have suggested that 
the same historical experiences explain the Danes' reluctance to 
accept the common foreign and security policy goals of the 
Maastricht Treaty. 
Other Nordic countries have had similar historical 
experiences. Sweden decided after the Napoleonic Wars that it 
was wise to be content with defending her existing territories, 
and Finland and other countries learned this lesson as a result of 
the last war. An attitude of 'defensive' defence was created, in 
which preservation of the national territory was justifiable but 
no other use of force. Finland was not alone in this thinking, of 
course, for a similar defensive, non-provocative attitude existed 
in most small NATO countries, despite the fact that they had 
opted for collective defence rather than neutrality as their main 
orientation. 
Finnish attitudes to peacekeeping have been coloured by 
this general aversion to the use of force outside one's own 
territory. In this tradition peacekeeping was understood as a 
definitely peace-oriented process best described by the words 
once used by Dag Hammarskiöld: "Peacekeeping is not a job for 
a soldier. But only a soldier can do it." 
This attitude became clear at the beginning of the Finnish 
debate on peace enforcement in 1993-94, in which the military 
leaders were quick to point out that Finland had neither the 
tradition, the capabilities nor the required professional army to 
participate in missions beyond its borders. The message was that 
we would be happy to continue with traditional peacekeeping 
but were not ready to go into anything more adventurous. This 
attitude did not last very long, however, for both Finland and the 
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great powers were forced to rethink their positions. 
The United Nations and the United States had encountered 
severe difficulties in Somalia, and there were a growing 
recognition in Finland that peacekeeping missions of the old 
kind hardly existed any longer. General Gustav Hägglund, who 
took over as Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces in 
November 1994, had already been arguing in 1993 that a modern 
war zone does not easily allow for the traditional positioning of 
peacekeepers between the two warring parties. Instead of there 
being clear lines of demarcation, today's missions are being 
conducted within countries afflicted by a domestic war or 
insurgency situation. This generates friction and consequently 
increases the need to protect oneself against both direct threats 
(hostile acts aimed at the peacekeepers themselves) and indirect 
ones (residual mines, crossfire, incursions, etc. and the possibility 
of a recurrence of war).61  
In 1993 the Ministry of Defence attempted to change the 
law on peacekeeping with the intention of allowing the troops to 
defend themselves better, although participation in peace 
enforcement was still clearly excluded. The proposal nevertheless 
met with such a degree of popular outcry that the government 
did not bother even to place it before Parliament. The feeling was 
that this was the first step towards sending Finnish soldiers to 
die in foreign countries. In view of the emotional response, the 
government decided to leave the whole question of revising the 
law on peacekeeping operations in abeyance until after the dust 
had settled. 
Meanwhile the military leaders were preparing the Finnish 
people for a more active role in international crisis management. 
General Hägglund stated in a speech in August 1994 that "there 
may be a situation in which Finland would, for reasons of its 
own security, consider it necessary to participate in crisis 
management functions outside our own borders."b" This statement 
shows that the Finnish leaders have come a long way from their 
initial conservative response to the new challenges of international 
security. They are now ready to participate constructively in 
both crisis management and new forms of peacekeeping. 
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DOCUMENTATION 
THE COMMAND AND ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM OF THE 
FINNISH DEFENCE FORCES 
Statement by the Defence Staff 
The fundamental task of the Finnish Defence Forces is to 
repel an armed attack against the country in all conceivable 
situations. This task prioritizes the demands placed on the 
organizational structure. It also means that the operational 
activities assume a supervising and dominant position in relation 
to other activities. 
The command and administrative system of the Finnish 
Defence Forces provides the framework for the territorial defence 
system. Primarily, the command system and the administrative 
organizations are designed to meet the demands of criusis and 
wartime situations, but they also have peacetime responsibilities. 
The total tasks of the system could well be divided into peacetime, 
stepped-up readiness and wartime tasks. 
The same organization cannot, however, operate in an 
optimal way in all situations. In normal times it has to be effective 
and function within acceptable economic constraints. At the same 
time it must be capable of expanding and of functioning, if 
necessary, as an efficient instrument in extreme circumstances. 
Planning for the latest reorganization of the Defence Forces 
was begun in 1986. The most important objectives in the 
reorganization were: 
- To preserve the territorial defence system and mobilization 
readiness covering the whole country; 
- To change the organization to correspond with the 
development that has taken place in the rest of society; 
- To exploit the benefits of rationalization that can be 
achieved with modern systems; 
- To organize personnel in a more efficient way; 
- To centralize materiel administration; 
- To delegate decision-making powers and resources and to 
reduce centralization; and 
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- To secure the command system in a crisis. 
After much planning and legislative work the new 
commmand and administrative system entered into force at the 
beginning of 1993. The changes regulating its line of action, 
modernisation and the reorganization of personnel training are 
still going on. A major innovation was the introduction of a 
system of management by objectives. Tasks and economic 
decision-making powers have been delegated to lower 
organizational levels. The new command and administrative 
system is estimated to function smoothly by the late 1990's. 
Essential changes in the organizational structure were: 
- The reorganisation of the Defence Staff and the 
establishment of the Army Staff within it; 
- A reduction in the number of operational areas of 
responsibility by dividing the country into three commands and 
further into 12 military provinces; 
- The centralization of materiel management, covering the 
lifespan of the materiel, on one echelon, and the setting 
up of the Defence Materiel Establishment; and 
- Focusing the responsibility for training regular personnel 
mainly on the National Defence College and the National Defence 
Institute. 
The Defence Staff is the supreme headquarters of the 
Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces and at the same time 
the military headquartes of the President of the Republic of 
Finland. Due to the dominance of the Army in the Finnish Defence 
Forces, the Defence Staff controls the armed forces on the ground 
through three commands. Thus the Army Staff within the Defence 
Staff is not an operational headquartwers of the Service. 
The main role of the three commands is on wartime 
planning and leadership. Each commander coordinates the 
operation of the Air Force and Navy elements within his 
command. As a headquarters responsible for operational 
preparations for crisis situations, the command is in charge of 
the operations, training and personnel planning of its 
headquarters and troops, and overall guidance of other activities 
as well. 
The Air Force Headquarters and the Naval Headquarters 
command their respective service units on a national level. Both 
services focus their activities in the area considered most 
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important at the moment. Each is responsible for the operations, 
personnel, training and special logistics of its own Service. 
The military province headquarters are charged with the 
defence of their areas. In peacetime they develop the mobilization 
system and logistics system of the provinces and undertake 
defence planning. The military provinces also form a co-operative 
network which coordinates civil administrative plans with 
national defence measures. The boundaries of the military 
provinces therefore coincide with those of civil provinces. The 
metropolitan area, however, forms its of military province, 
different from the civilian one. 
The peacetime units are responsible for the training of both 
conscripts and reservists. They will be expanded, if necessary, to 
form wartime units and they mobilize a part of the wartime 
troops. A military unit receives the national norms from the 
Defence Staff, and the guidance needed for personnel training 
from the commands. In operation and logistics the unit is 
primarily commanded by the military province. 
The new command and administrative system has reduced 
the number of regional headquarters by half, resulting in the 
merger of units and establishments and a more efficient use of 
personnel. Full advantage can be taken of the system as the new 
method of leadership by objectives has been introduced. 
The renewal of the Defence Forces' command and 
administrative system was carried out shortly before the radical 
savings plan was implemented in the Finnish state administration. 
We have been compelled to use some of the resources released 
by the reorganization to achieve savings objectives, and only a 
part of the resources have been directed to improved efficiency. 
Nevertheless, the reorganisation has proceeded well during the 
first years: the new organization has substantially increased 
flexibility and efficiency of the Defence Forces. The changes that 
have taken place in Finnish society and around us have been 
taken into consideration. Finally, a sound basis has been created 
for efficient and modern lines of action as well as continuous 
development of the Finnish Defence Forces. 
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FINLAND'S NEW SYSTEM OF OFFICER EDUCATION 
Statement by Major-General Antero Karvinen, Rector of the 
National Defence College, 1988-1994. 
In days gone by, it was very often the family background of 
a young man that persuaded his choice to become an officer, if 
indeed he had the chance to choose his career at all. For the 
education of a soldier began at a very young age. The military 
career of a modern Finnish officer is determined in quite a 
different way. The first prerequisite for a military career is a 
sound secondary school education and the matriculation 
certificate. The second is to perform well as a conscript and to 
complete the Reserve Officer Course with good grades. In other 
words, a young man must demonstrate his excellence when 
serving as a conscript. This procedure has several advantages: 
- all officers will have had a similar and solid basic education, 
- all will have demonstrated their abilities early, by standing 
out amongst other conscripts, 
- future officers will have become familiar with the Finnish 
conscription system through personal experience. 
The above arrangement will continue to be the foundation 
for career officers trained under the new system, which came 
into force on 1 January 1993. Some observations about the new 
system can already be made. 
The restructuring was carried out with the following 
considerations in mind: 
1. The training of career officers was to be organized into 
larger and more coherent units, in place of the many shorter 
courses and training sessions of the past. It was decided that the 
training should be divided into two levels: a four-year period of 
cadet training leading to the degree of officer and a two-year 
period leading to the degree of general staff officer. At both 
levels students are selected through an entrance examination. 
The total ength of studies is about 6 years. This, then, is the basic 
price to be paid for a professional officer capable of shouldering 
responsibility at the highest level. 
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Training for the officer degree stresses practical knowledge 
and mastery of the peacetime tasks of a junior officer. However, 
cadets also receive sufficient instruction in tactics to be able to 
assume the command of a battalion in wartime. In the new 
system cadets are allowed some freedom to select subjects and 
thus influence their own study programme. Each cadet will 
nevertheless receive a definite amount of basic training in core 
military subjects. Moreover, the cadet study programmes take 
account of the special needs of all the services and their branches, 
to ensure that junior officers are capable of performing a variety 
of duties, ranging from infantry training officer to pilot of a 
military aircraft. 
By statutory degree, the officer's degree is now equivalent 
to a university degree at master's level and fully comparable to 
other master's degrees awarded in Finland. 
The postgraduate programme leading to the general staff 
officer's degree is begun only after 5-6 years of practical service 
and experience and is completed in two stages. All officers will 
attend the Senior Staff Officer Course, and on the basis of this 
some will be selected to continue in the General Staff Officer 
Course. This second course will be divided into several areas of 
concentration appropriate for the training and education of 
specialists. Although the decision to become a general staff officer 
is a voluntary one, recent years have shown a clear increase in 
the desire to do this. 
2. Concurrent with the reorganization of education, the 
National Defence College, which bears the responsibility for 
instruction, was itself reorganized (Figure). Institutions of military 
training that earlier had been administered and organized 
separately were brought together under a single administration. 
Instruction and research were combined into departments 
organized along subject lines and responsible for instruction at 
all levels. At the same time, the lecturer and instructor 
organizations, until then separate, were coordinated. 
Administration and logistics were combined into a single unit, 
allowing clear savings and a simpler operation. 
3. The standard of instruction has noticeably improved as a 
result of the modernization and centralization. The departments 
have been able to focus their resources on certain courses and 
exercises as needed. Good results have been attained in several 
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exercises. 
4. The new organization has made it possible to commence 
military research in fields that until now have suffered from lack 
of personnel resources. 
5. Uniting the three old military training institutes into one 
has also made it possible to cut back on personnel and reduce 
operating expenses. 
The new College begins its work well aware of the hopes 
placed on it, but the experiences accumulated thus far encourage 
us to move persistently forward. It will be some time before the 
reorganization is complete: before the first officer, starting as a 
cadet, has attended all the courses at the College, we will be well 
into the 21st century. The other universities in Finland have 
supported the College from the start, which speaks well for 
fruitful cooperation in the future. 
The improved educational programmes offered by the 
National Defence College, and effective instructors, are ensuring 
the success of the new system of educating Finnish officers in 
spite of the cuts in defence appropriations. 
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